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Social interactions arguably provide a rationale for several important phe-
nomena, from smoking and other risky behavior in teens to peer eects in school
performance. We study social interactions in dynamic economies. For these
economies, we provide existence (Markov Perfect Equilibrium in pure strate-
gies), ergodicity, and welfare results. We characterize several equilibrium prop-
erties of policy functions, spatial correlations, and social multiplier eects. Most
importantly, we study formally the issue of the identication of social interac-
tions, emphasizing the restrictions imposed by dynamic equilibrium conditions
with respect to economies populated by myopic agents and economies in which
spatial correlation is induced by selection.
Keywords: Conditional covariance stationarity, conformity, ergodicity, habits,
identication, Markov perfect equilibrium, social interactions, social norms.
1. INTRODUCTION
Agents interact in markets as well as socially|that is, in the various socioeconomic
groups they belong to. Models of social interactions are designed to capture in a simple
abstract way socioeconomic environments in which markets do not mediate all of agents'
choices. In such environments agents' choices are determined by their preferences as well
as by their interactions with others|that is, their positions in a predetermined network
of relationships, e.g., a family, a peer group, or more generally any socioeconomic group.1
Social interactions arguably provide a rationale for several important phenomena, Peer
eects, in particular, have been indicated as one of the main empirical determinants of
1We are grateful to Bernard Salani e for some insightful comments early on. We also thank Massim-
iliano Amarante, Olivier Armantier, Jess Benhabib, Ken Binmore, Michele Boldrin, Yann Bramoull e,
Pierre-Andr e Chiappori, In-Koo Cho, Aureo De Paula, Bryan Graham, Ali Horta csu, Fr ed eric Koessler,
Takashi Kunimoto, Justin Leroux, David Levine, Bob Lucas, Debraj Ray, Manuel Santos, Tom Sar-
gent, Jos e Scheinkman, Karl Schlag, Paolo Siconol, Yves Sprumont, Bruno Strulovici, Jean Tirole, and
many seminar participants. Finally, we would like to thank Ben Golub and Itai Sher who read an early
version of the paper and made detailed suggestions which greatly improved the presentation. Part of
this research was done while  Ozg ur was visiting the Economics Department at the Universit e Laval.
Thanks to Yann Bramoull e and Bernard Fortin for organizing the visit.  Ozg ur is grateful for nancial
support to \La Chaire du Canada en  Economie des Politiques Sociales et des Ressources Humaines" at
Universit e Laval, CIREQ, CIRP EE, and FQRSC.
aUniversit e de Montr eal, Department of Economics, CIREQ, CIRANO; onur.ozgur@umontreal.ca
bNew York University, Department of Economics, NBER, CIREQ; alberto.bisin@nyu.edu
1The integration of models of social interactions within economic theory is an active and interesting
area of research. See the recent Handbook of Social Economics, Benhabib, Bisin, and Jackson (2011).
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risky behavior in adolescents.2 Relatedly, peer eects have been studied in connection
with education outcomes,3 obesity,4 friendship and sex, 5 labor market referrals,6 neigh-
borhood and employment segregation, 7 criminal activity,8 and several other socioeco-
nomic phenomena.9
The large majority of the existing models of social interactions are static; or, when dy-
namic models of social interactions are studied, it is typically assumed that agents are my-
opic and their choices are subject to particular behavioral assumptions.10 In this paper,
we contribute to this literature by studying social interactions in dynamic economies. We
focus our attention on linear economies, in which each agent's preferences are quadratic.
Dynamic linear models of course have appealing analytical properties. Hansen and Sar-
gent (2004) study this class of models systematically, exploiting the tractability of linear
control methods and matrix Riccati equations. While the class of economies we study in
this paper allows for a countable number of heterogeneous agents and an innite horizon,
giving rise to innite dimensional systems, some tractability is still maintained. Further-
more, in the class of economies we study agents display preferences for conformity, that
is, preferences which incorporate the desire to conform to the choices of agents in a
reference group.
More specically, each agent's preferences are hit by random preference shocks over
time. Each agent interacts with agents in his social reference group, in the sense that
each agent's instantaneous preferences depend on the current choices of agents in his so-
2See e.g., Axtell et al. (2006), Cutler and Glaeser (2007), Gaviria and Raphael (2001), Krauth (2006),
Kremer and Levy (2008), Nakajima (2007), Sacerdote (2001).
3Altonji et al. (2005), Ammermueller and Pischke (2009), B enabou (1996), Bifulco et al. (2009),
Borjas (1995), De Giorgi et al. (2009), Evans et al. (1992), Hoxby (2000a,b), Soetevent and Kooreman
(2007).
4Burke and Heiland (2007), Christakis and Fowler (2007).
5Akerlof et al. (1996), Bearman et al. (2004), Cipollone and Rosolia (2007), Conti et al. (2009),
Currarini et al. (2009), Kandel (1978), Moody (2001).
6Bayer et al. (2008), Calvo-Armengol and Jackson (2004), Conley and Topa (2002), Goldin and Katz
(2002), Granovetter (1973, 1995), Ioannides and Datcher Loury (2004), and Topa (2001).
7B enabou (1993), Case and Katz (1991), Crane (1991), Durlauf (1996, 2004), Ho and Sen (2005),
Katz et al. (2001), Ludwig et al. (2001), Mobius (2000), Schelling (1972).
8Calvo-Armengol et al. (2009), Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman (1996), Kling et al. (2005), Lud-
wig et al. (2001).
9See Bisin et al. (2010), Glaeser and Scheinkman (2001), Moody (2001) for surveys.
10Exceptions include an example on female labor force participation in Glaeser and Scheinkman
(2001), Binder and Pesaran (2001) on life-cycle consumption under social Interactions, Blume (2003)
on social stigma, Brock and Durlauf (2010) and De Paula (2009) on duration models, Ioannides and
Soetevent (2007) on endogenous local and global interactions, where agents best respond to lagged
decisions, and the theoretical analysis of Bisin, Horst, and  Ozg ur (2006).
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cial reference group, as a direct externality. Each agent's instantaneous preferences also
depend on the agent's own previous choice, representing the inherent costs to dynamic
behavioural changes due e.g., to habits. When agents' reference groups overlap, each
agent's optimal choice depends on all the other agents's previous choices and current
preference shocks, as long as they are observable. We allow for complete and incomplete
information with respect to preference shocks. Requiring that the social and informa-
tional structure of each agent satisfy a symmetry condition, we restrict our analysis to
symmetric Markov perfect equilibria. Agents' choices at equilibrium are determined by
linear policy (best reply) functions. More specically, e.g., in innite-horizon economies,
a symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium is represented by a symmetric policy function,
g, which maps an agent's current choice at time t, linearly in each agent's past choices,
xb
t 1, in each agent's contemporaneous idiosyncratic preference shock, b















For these economies, we provide some fundamental theoretical results: (Markov perfect)
equilibria exist (for nite economies they are unique) and they induce an ergodic stochas-
tic process over the equilibrium conguration of actions. Furthermore, a stationary er-
godic distribution exists. We also derive a recursive algorithm to compute equilibria. The
proof of the existence theorem, in particular, requires some subtle arguments. In fact,
standard variational arguments require bounding the marginal eect of any innitesimal
change dxa on the agent's value function. But in the class of economies we study, the
envelope theorem (as e.g., in Benveniste and Scheinkman (1979)) is not sucient for
this purpose, as dxa aects agent a's value function directly and indirectly, through its
eects on all agents b 2 Ana's choices, which in turn aect agent a's value function.
The marginal eect of any innitesimal change dxa is then an innite sum of endoge-
nous terms. In our economy, however, we can exploit the linearity of policy functions to
represent a symmetric MPE by a xed point of a recursive map which can be directly
studied.
Exploiting the linear structure of our economies we can study equilibria in some detail,
characterizing the parameters of the policy function as well as a fundamental statistical
property of equilibrium, the cross-sectional auto-correlation of actions. Based on this,
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we obtain a series of results regarding the welfare properties of equilibrium and vari-
ous comparative dynamics exercises of interest. First of all, we show that, since social
interactions are modelled in this paper as a preference externality, equilibria will not
be ecient in general. We also characterize the form of the ineciency: at equilibrium
each agent's policy function weights too heavily the agent's own preference shock and
previous action and not enough the other agents'. The comparative dynamics exercises
illustrate e.g., the equilibrium eects of the strength of social interactions and of the
social and informational structure of the economy.
Finally, we exploit our characterization results of the equilibria to address generally
the issue of identication of social interactions in our context, with population data.
While the empirical literature has often interpreted a signicant high correlation of
socioeconomic choices across agents, e.g., peers, as evidence of social interactions, in the
form, e.g., of preferences for conformity, it is well known at least since the work of Manski
(1993) that the empirical study of social interactions is plagued by subtle identication
problems. Intuitively, in our economy for instance, the spatial correlation of actions at
equilibrium can be due to social interactions or to the spatial correlation of preference
shocks. More formally, take two agents, e.g., agent a and agent b. A positive correlation
between xa
t and xb
t could be due to e.g., preference for conformity. But the positive
correlation between xa
t and xb
t could also be due to a positive correlation between a
t and
b
t. In this last case, preferences for conformity and social interactions would play no role
in the correlation of actions at equilibrium. Rather, such correlation would be due to the
fact that agents have correlated preferences. Correlated preferences could generally be
due to some sort of assortative matching or positive selection, which induce agents with
correlated preferences to interact socially.
In the context of our economy, we ask whether the restrictions implied by the dynamic
equilibrium analysis help identify social interactions and distinguish them from correlated
preferences. We show that the answer is in fact armative, but only if the economy is
non-stationary, in a precise sense. To illustrate our results, consider for instance the
issue of peer eects in adolescents' substance use. Suppose the econometrician observes
the behavior of a population of students in a school over time (at dierent grades). A
signicant high correlation of socioeconomic choices across students in the school could
be due to selection in the endogenous composition of the school in terms of unobserved
(to the econometrician) correlated characteristics of the agents. Any signicant variation
in students' behavior through time (grades) must however be due to social interactions.
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A student whose choice is aected by the choices of his school peers will in fact rationally
anticipate how much longer he will interact with them. In particular, his propensity to
conform to his peers' actions will tend to decrease over time (grades) and will be the
lowest in the nal years in the school. This non-stationarity of each student's behavior at
equilibrium is the key to the identication of social interaction in our class of economies.11
The simplicity of linear models allows us to extend our analysis in several directions
which are important in applications and empirical work. This is the case, for instance of
general (including asymmetric) neighborhood network structures for social interactions.
But our analysis extends also to general stochastic processes for preference shocks and
to the addition of global interactions. One particular form of global interactions occurs
when each agent's preferences depend on an average of actions of all other agents in the
population, e.g. Brock and Durlauf (2001a), and Glaeser and Scheinkman (2003). This is
the case, for instance, if agents have preferences for social status. More generally, global
interactions could capture preferences to adhere to aggregate norms of behavior, such as
specic group cultures, or other externalities as well as price eects. Finally, and perhaps
most importantly, we extend our analysis to encompass a richer structure of dynamic
dependence of agents' actions at equilibrium. In particular we study an economy in which
agents' past behavior is aggregated through an accumulated stock variable which carries
habit persistence, which can be directly applied e.g., to the issue of teenage substance
addiction due to peer pressure at school. With respect to the addiction literature, as
e.g., Becker and Murphy (1988), we model the dynamics of addiction considering peer
eects not only in a single-person decision problem, but rather in a social equilibrium,
allowing for the intertemporal feedback channel between agents across social space and
through time.12 In this context we show that in equilibrium each agent's choice depends
on the stock of his neighbors' actions, on their long-term behavioral patterns rather
than just on their previous period actions. Also, in non-stationary economies, as the
nal period approaches, each agent assigns higher weights to his own stock, giving rise
to an initiation-addiction behavioral pattern at equilibrium which is consistent with
observation, e.g., in Cutler and Glaeser (2007) and DeCicca et al. (2008).
11This pattern of behavior appears consistent with the peer eects study of Hoxby (2000a,b).
12See also Becker et al. (1994), Gul and Pesendorfer (2007), Gruber and Koszegi (2001); see Rozen
(2010) for theoretical foundations for intrinsic linear habit formation; see also Elster (1999) and Elster
and Skog (1999) for surveys.
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2. DYNAMIC ECONOMIES WITH SOCIAL INTERACTIONS
While we develop most of our analysis in the context of linear models, it is useful to
set up the general model rst, as we do in this section, to be as clear and specic as
possible regarding the assumptions we impose on the economy we study.
Time is discrete and is denoted by t = 1;:::;T. We allow both for innite economies
(T = 1) and economies with an end period (T < 1). A typical economy is populated by
a countable set of agents A, a generic element of which being denoted by a.13 Each agent
lives for the duration of the economy. At the beginning of each period t, agent a's random
preference type a
t is drawn from , a compact subset of a nite dimensional Euclidean
space Rn. The random variables a
t are independently and identically distributed across
time and agents with probability law .14 We assume, with no loss of generality, that
the random variable t := (a
t)a2A is dened, for all t, on the canonical probability space
(;F;P), where  := f(a)a2A : a 2 g. At each period t, agent a 2 A chooses an
action xa
t from the set X, a compact subset of a nite dimensional Euclidean space Rp.
Let X := fx = (xa)a2A : xa 2 Xg be the space of individual action proles.
Each agent a 2 A interacts with agents in the set N(a), a nonempty subset of the
set of agents A, which abstractly represents agent a's social reference group. The map
A : N ! 2A is referred to as a neighbourhood correspondence and is assumed exogenous.
Agent a's instantaneous preferences depend on the current choices of agents in his refer-
ence group, fxb
tgb2N(a), representing social interactions as direct preference externalities.
Agent a's instantaneous preferences also depend on the agent's own previous choice,
xa
t 1, representing inherent costs to dynamic behavioural changes due e.g., to habits. In

























Agents discount expected future utilities using the common stationary discount factor
13We study an economy populated by a countably innite number of agents where A := Z, but our
analysis applies to economies with a nite number of agents.
14We use the i.i.d. assumption for methodological clarity. The focus throughout the paper until
Section 6 is on understanding purely endogenously generated equilibrium correlations so that they could
be cleanly compared to the alternative models of correlated preferences discussed in the identication
section (Section 6). The model, of course, is exible to accomodate correlated shocks across agents and
time. We show how this is done in Section 7.2.
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 2 (0;1).
Let xt 1 = (x0;x1;:::;xt 1) and t 1 = (1;:::;t 1) be the (t   1)-period choices
and type realizations, where x0 2 X is the initial conguration. Before each agent's time
t choice, xt 1 is observed by all agents and the current value of the random variable
t realizes. Agent a 2 A observes only the part Iat := fb
t : b 2 I(a)g, where
I(a)  A is his information set. Similarly, let Iat 1 = (Ia1;:::;Iat 1). We study
both economies with complete information, I(a) = A, and economies with incomplete
information, I(a)   A. After time t choices are made, xt = (xb
t)b2A 2 X becomes common
knowledge and the economy moves to time t + 1.
A strategy for an agent a is a sequence of measurable functions xa = (xa
t), where for
each t, xa
t : Xt  (I(a))t ! X. Agents' strategies along with the probability law for
types induce a stochastic process over future conguration paths. Each agent a 2 A's

















   (x0;1)
#
(2.1)
given the strategies of other agents and given (x0;Ia1) 2 X  I(a).
We require that the social and informational structure satises the following symmetry
restrictions:15
1. For all a;b 2 A, N(b) = Rb aN(a), where Rb a is the canonical shift operator in
the direction b   a.16
2. For all a;b 2 A, I(b) = Rb aI(a).
We restrict our analysis to symmetric Markov perfect equilibria. Agents' strategies are
Markovian if after any t   1-period history (xt 1;t), they depend only on the previous
period conguration xt 1 and the current type realizations t.
Because of symmetry, it is enough to analyze the optimization problem relative to a
single reference agent, say agent 0 2 A. Assume that the optimal choice of any economic
agent b 2 A is determined by a continuous choice function g : XI(0)f1;:::;Tg ! X
such that for all t = 1;:::;T and after any history (xt 1;t) 2 Xt  t, his t-th period
15Heterogeneity can be incorporated into the probabilistic structure of the types a
t . Also, we can
allow for heterogeneity of the network structure across agents by augmenting the strategy spaces to
incorporate network structure into individual heterogeneity. We do this in Section 7.1.
16That is, c 2 N(a) if and only if c + (b   a) 2 N(b). The operations of addition and subtraction are
legitimate given that we typically let A := Zd, the d-dimensional integer lattice.
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The value function associated with this dynamic choice problem can be shown to satisfy
Bellman's Principle of Optimality by standard arguments (see e.g., Stokey and Lucas












































for t = 1;:::;T and for all (xt 1;t) 2 Xt  t.18 We are now ready to dene our
equilibrium concept.
Definition 1 A symmetric Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) of a dynamic economy
with social interactions is a measurable map g : X  I(0)  f1;:::;Tg ! X such that

















































Clearly, an MPE is necessarily a subgame perfect equilibrium; that is, each agent's
continuation strategy is a best response to other agent's continuation strategies after
any possible history. Notice also the time notation we use for the Markovian policy:
g
T (t 1) denotes the rst-period equilibrium choice in a T   (t   1)-period economy.
Since economies are nested, g
T (t 1) represents also the t-period equilibrium choice in a
T-period economy.
We conclude this section with a few remarks to justify our focus on MPEs. First of all,
17The preference shocks being serially uncorrelated, we do not need to condition on the value of past
realizations. See Section 7.2 for a treatment of persistent shocks.
18We have adopted the the convention that V 0
g (x;I0 ) := 0 for any (x;) 2 X  .
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Markovian strategies are not a restriction for nite-horizon economies: we prove that the
unique symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium for any nite-horizon economy is neces-
sarily Markovian. Moreover, in an innite horizon economy (T = 1), a symmetric MPE
is not necessarily stationary. The sequence of unique MPEs for nite horizon economies
converges however to a g : XI(0) ! X which turns out to be a stationary MPE of the
innite-horizon economy whose properties we focus on. Finally, we refer to Bisin, Horst,
and  Ozg ur (2006) for a discussion of non-Markovian equilibria in a related context.
3. DYNAMIC LINEAR ECONOMIES WITH SOCIAL INTERACTIONS AND CONFORMITY
PREFERENCES
We focus our attention on linear economies with conformity preferences. These are
environments in which each agent's preferences incorporate the desire to conform to the
choices of agents in his reference group.19
Preferences for conformity arguably provide a rationale for several important social
phenomena. The empirical literature has for instance documented preferences for con-
formity as a motivation for smoking and other risky behaviour in teens. Similarly, the
role of conformity is also documented by Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman (1996)
with regards to criminal activity and by a large literature with regards to peer eects
in education outcomes.20 Conformity also represents a natural environment in which to
study dynamic equilibrium. In many relevant social phenomena, in fact, the eects of
preferences for conformity are amplied by the presence of limits to the reversibility of
dynamic choices. This is of course the case for smoking, alcohol abuse and other risky
teen behaviour, which are hard to reverse because they might lead to chemical addic-
tions. In other instances, while addiction per se is not at issue, nonetheless behavioural
choices are hardly freely reversible because of various social and economic constraints,
as is the case, for instance, of engaging in criminal activity. Finally, exogenous and pre-
dictable changes in the composition of groups, as e.g., in the case of school peers at the
end of a school cycle, introduce important non-stationarities in the agents' choice. These
non-stationarities also call for a formal analysis of dynamic social interactions.
With the objective of providing a clean and simple analysis of dynamic social in-
teractions in a conformity economy, we impose strong(er than required) but natural
19While we model preferences for conformity directly as a preference externality, we intend this as a
reduced form of models of behavior in groups which induce indirect preferences for conformity, as e.g.,
Jones (1984), Cole et al. (1992), Bernheim (1994), Peski (2007).
20See the Introduction for the relevant references.
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assumptions.21 In particular (i) we restrict the neighborhood correspondence to repre-
sent the minimal interaction structure allowing for overlapping groups, (ii) we restrict
preferences to be quadratic, and (iii) we impose enough regularity conditions on the
agents' choice problem to render it convex. Formally,
Assumption 1 A linear conformity economy satises the following.
1. Let A := Z represent the countable set of agents. Each agent interacts with his
immediate neighbors, i.e., for all a 2 A, N(a) := fa   1;a + 1g.


































where 1;2; and 3; are positive constants.









t    
2 d < 1.23
Assumption 1-1 requires that the reference group of each agent a 2 A be composed
of his immediate neighbors in the social space, namely the agents a   1 and a + 1. The
utility function u dened in Assumption 1-2 describes the trade-o that agent a 2 A
faces between matching his individual characteristics (xa
t 1;a
t) and the utility he receives




t ). The dierent values of
i represent dierent levels of intensity of the social interaction motive relative to the
own (or intrinsic) motive. Finally, Assumption 1-2 and 1-3 jointly guarantee that the
agents' choice problem is convex. Finally, notice that the requirements that 1; 2 > 0
anchor agents' preferences on their own private types and past choices. It is easy to see
that, without such anchor, actions are driven only by social interactions and a large
multiplicity of equilibria arises.
21See Section 7 for possible directions in which the structure and the results we obtain are easily
generalized.
22We will call a measure  `absolutely continuous' if it is absolutely continuous with respect to the
Lebesgue measure , i.e., if (A) = 0 for every measurable set A for which (A) = 0.
23We need absolute continuity only when we prove ineciency. All other results are obtained without
that assumption.
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3.1. Equilibrium
We provide here the basic theoretical results regarding our dynamic linear social in-
teraction economy with conformity. The reader only interested in the characterization
can skip this section, keeping in mind that equilibria exist (for nite economies they
are unique) and they induce an ergodic stochastic process over paths of action proles.
Furthermore, a stationary ergodic distribution also exists for the economy. Finally, a
recursive algorithm to compute equilibria is derived. Unless otherwise mentioned specif-
ically, the proofs of all statement and other results can be found in the Supplemental
Appendix.
Theorem 1 (Existence - Complete Information) Consider an economy with conformity
preferences and complete information.
1. If the time horizon is nite (T < 1), then the economy admits a unique symmetric
MPE g : X    f1; ;Tg 7! X such that for all t 2 f1;:::;Tg, for all

















t +eT (t 1)  P a:s:
where ca
;da




) = 1, 0    T. Moreover, the
equilibrium is also unique in the class of subgame perfect equilibria (SPE), meaning
that there does not exist any non-Markovian SPE for our economy.
2. If the time horizon is innite (T = 1), then the economy admits a symmetric














t + e P   a:s:
where ca;da;e  0, for a 2 A, and e +
P
a2A(ca + da) = 1.24
The theorems in this section can be extended with straightforward modications to
the case of incomplete information. We state without proof, e.g., the existence theorem
for economies with incomplete information next.
24Several assumptions can be relaxed while guaranteeing existence. In particular, the symmetry of
the neighborhood structure can be substantially relaxed. See Section 7.1 for the discussion.
ectaart.cls ver. 2006/04/11 file: OB_11.tex date: April 5, 201112
Theorem 2 (Existence - Incomplete Information) Consider an economy with confor-
mity preferences and with incomplete information.
1. For T < 1, the economy admits a unique symmetric MPE g : X  I(0) 
f1; ;Tg 7! X such that for all t 2 f1;:::;Tg,
g















t +eT (t 1)  P a:s:
where ca
;da






 = 1, 0    T.
2. For T = 1, the economy admits a symmetric MPE g : X  I(0) 7! X such that
g












t + e P   a:s:
where ca;da;e  0 and e +
P
a2 A ca +
P
a2I(0) da = 1.
The proof of the existence theorem requires some subtle arguments. While referring
to the Appendix for details, a few comments here in this respect will be useful. Consider
the (innite dimensional) choice problem of each agent a 2 A. To be able to apply
standard variational arguments to this problem it is necessary to bound the marginal
eect of any innitesimal change dxa on the agent's value function. To this end, the
Envelope theorem (as e.g., in Benveniste and Scheinkman (1979)) is not enough, as dxa
aects agent a's value function directly and indirectly, through its eects on all agents
b 2 Ana's choices, which in turn aect agent a's value function. The marginal eect
of any innitesimal change dxa is then an innite sum. Furthermore, each term in the
sum contains endogenous terms from some agent b 2 Ana's policy function (and there is
an innite number of them), which makes it impossible to adopt the methodology used
by Santos (1991) to prove the smoothness of the policy function in innite dimensional
recursive choice problems.
In our economy, with quadratic utility, policy functions are necessarily linear and,
provided we show that equilibria are interior, symmetric MPE's in pure strategies can
be represented by a policy function which is obtained as a xed point of a recursive map
which can be directly studied.25 Extending the existence proof to general preferences
25The class of economies we study are theoretically equivalent to a class of stochastic games, with an
innite number of agents, and uncountable state spaces. Ready-to-use results for the existence of \pure
strategy" Markov-perfect equilibria for these environments do not exist. For the state of the art in that
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would require therefore sucient conditions on the structural parameters to control the
curvature of the policy function of each agent's decision problem. We conjecture that
this can be done although sucient conditions do not appear transparently from our
proof.
3.2. The parameters of the policy function
By exploiting the linearity of policy functions, our method of proof is constructive, pro-
ducing a direct and useful recursive computational characterization for the parameters
of the symmetric policy function at equilibrium. We repeatedly exploit this characteriza-
tion in the next section e.g., when performing comparative dynamics exercises. Consider
the choice problem of agent 0. For any T-period economy, agent 0's dynamic program



















1 + T  
!
where the coecients T and b
T, and T are the eects on agent zero's discounted
expected marginal utility of changes in agents 0 and b's rst period actions and the
change in the level of  , respectively.
Let LT be a map induced by (3.2) s.t. (^ c; ^ d; ^ e) = LT(c;d;e), by matching coecients
of the policy on both sides of (3.2), i.e., for each a 2 A
(3.3)



























Let Lc;d;e := f(c;d;e) : e  0;ca  0;da  0;8a and e +
P
a(ca + da) = 1g be the
space of nonnegative coecient sequences summing to 1. The existence of an equilibrium




T) which is the xed point of the map LT : Lc;d;e ! Lc;d;e
induced by (3.2).





a6=0 ;T, depend only on the con-
literature, see Mertens and Parthasarathy (1987) and Due et al. (1994). See also Mertens (2002) and
Vieille (2002) for surveys.
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s=1 in a linear fashion (see (A.10), (A.12),
and (A.14) for their detailed expressions). For T = 1, the parameters of L1 are dictated





1 = 0, for all b 6=  1;0;1, and 1 = 0. Thus, the map L1 dened by the system in (3.3)
becomes a contraction mapping whose unique xed point is computed as the unique root
to a second-order dierence equation that satises transversality conditions toward both
innities. Consequently, the equilibrium policy coecients are computed as in the next
Theorem.
Theorem 3 (Recursive algorithm) Consider a nite-horizon T-period economy with
conformity preferences (i > 0, i = 1;2;3) and complete information.
(i) The map L1 for a one-period economy, dened in (3.3), admits a unique xed point.



































  1 and 1 = 1 + 2 + 23.





s=2 are computed recursively as the unique xed points of
the contraction maps Ls : Lc;d;e ! Lc;d;e, s = 2;:::;T, dened in (3.3), whose
parameters s;(a






=1, as dened in (A.10), (A.12), and (A.14).
(iii) Moreover, limT!1 (c
T;d
T;e
T) = (c;d;e) exists and it is the coecient sequence
of the stationary Markovian equilibrium policy function for the innite-horizon
economy.
Fixed point calculations take less than a few seconds on an ordinary computer, for
each period. Finally, the sequence of xed point maps that we compute at each iteration
converges to a policy sequence, which turns out to be the innite-horizon stationary
MPE. The convergence is very rapid, under a few minutes.
3.3. Ergodicity
With such a characterization of the parameters of the policy function at hand, we are
able to characterize very tightly the spatial (cross-sectional) and intertemporal behavior
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Figure 1.| Non-stationary Optimal Policy.
of the equilibrium process emerging from the class of dynamic models we study. Let 0
be an initial distribution on the conguration space X. Given the initial distribution
0, a stationary MPE of the economy with conformity induces an equilibrium process
(xt 2 X)1
t=0 (via the policy function g) and an associated transition function Qg. This
latter generates iteratively a sequence of distributions (t)
1
t=1 on the conguration space
X, i.e., for t = 0;1;:::
t+1 (A) = tQg (A) =
Z
X
Qg (xt;A) t (dxt+1)
We show rst that, given the induced equilibrium process, the transition function Qg
admits an invariant distribution , i.e.,  =  Qg and that the equilibrium process
starting from  is ergodic26.
Ergodicity does not necessarily imply the convergence of the equilibrium process to
a unique distribution starting from an arbitrary initial distribution 0. Conditions are
necessary to guarantee such convergence.27 We next show that, for any initial distribution
0 and a stationary Markovian policy function g, the equilibrium process (xt 2 X)1
t=0






fdP P-almost surely for every bounded measurable function f : X ! R. See,
e.g., Due et al. (1994) for a similar usage.
27The well-known D oblin conditions to that eect can be found in Doob (1953). See also Tweedie
(1975) for a similar characterization.
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converges in distribution to the invariant distribution , independently of 0.28 This also
implies that  is the unique invariant distribution of the equilibrium process (xt 2 X)1
t=0.
More specically,






a2A is i.i.d. with respect to a
and t according to . The equilibrium process (xt 2 X)1
t=0 induced by a symmetric sta-
tionary Markov perfect equilibrium of an economy with conformity via the policy function
g(xt 1; t) and the unique invariant measure  as the initial distribution is ergodic; 























a2A ca is the sum of coecients in the stationary policy function that
multiply corresponding agents' last period choices. Moreover, the sequence (t)
1
t=1 of dis-
tributions generated by the equilibrium process (xt 2 X)1
t=0 converges to  in the topology
of weak convergence for probability measures, independently of any arbitrary initial dis-
tribution 0.29
4. CHARACTERIZATION OF EQUILIBRIUM
Exploiting the linear structure of our economies we can study equilibria in some detail.








































a2A(ca + da) = 1, in the innite-horizon case.
First of all, we study the parameters of the policy function. The coecients cb
T (t 1)
28Note however that Theorem 1 does not guarantee that the policy function g(xt 1; t) is unique.
29A sequence of probability measures (t) is said to converge weakly (or in the topology of weak
convergence for probability measures) to  if, for any bounded, measurable, continuous function f :




fd almost surely (see e.g. Kallenberg (2002), p.65).
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and db
T (t 1) (resp. cb and db in the case of innite-horizon economies), in particular,
may be viewed as a measure for the total impact of the action x
a+b
t 1 and of the preference
shock 
a+b
t of agent a + b, respectively, on the optimal current choice of agent a; where
b concisely represents the social distance between the two agents.30 Furthermore, we
study a fundamental statistical property of equilibrium, cross-sectional auto-correlation
of actions. In fact, although any agent a 2 A interacts directly only with a small subset
of the population, at equilibrium, each agent's optimal choice is correlated with those of
all the other agents. Let a;T denote the conditional correlation between the rst-period
equilibrium actions of agents a-step away from each other, in the T-period economy,


















Consider rst a nite-horizon economy. Since the policy function for this economy is












The impact of an agent a + b on agent a tends to zero as jbj ! 1. In this sense, linear
conformity economies display weak social interactions.
Furthermore, as we have shown in Section 3.2,
lim
T!1
cT = c; lim
T!1
dT = d; and lim
T!1
eT = e
30See Akerlof (1997) for richer denitions of social distance.
























Due to the symmetry imposed on our economy, such correlations are independent of agents' labels but
depends only on jb aj. Consequently, we can dene the conditional correlation function with distances
computed relative to any agent, in particular agent 0.
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The nite-horizon parameters converge (uniformly) to the innite-horizon stationary
policy parameters.
Finally, equilibrium policy functions are non-stationary in the nite economy, as ra-
tional forward-looking agents change their behavior optimally through time. In the nal
periods, for example, social interactions lose weight relative to individual characteristics;
see Figure 1.32
4.2. Cross-sectional Auto-correlations
Exploiting the equilibrium characterization provided by Theorems 1 and 3, and the

























T is the discrete self-convolution of the equilibrium policy
sequence dT = (d
a1
T )a12A, where a acts as the shift parameter.33 In Figure 2 we show how
the convolution behaves with respect to the distance a, for the same set of parameters























































Figure 2.| Convolution of the Policy Coecient Sequence.
32We plot in Figure 1 only one side of the policy coecient sequence to get a close-up view of
the change in equilibrium behavior. The left hand side is the mirror image of that due to symmetry.
Parameter values for this gure are 1
3 = 1, 3
2 = 10, and  = :95
33See (D.1) for the derivation.










the a-step conditional cross-sectional autocorrelations for the rst-period equilibrium
choices of the T-period economy. Exploiting the recursive algorithm provided by Theorem
3, we can compute these autocorrelations easily for any nite economy. We can then study
the behavior of the conditional correlation function a;T through time (T) and across
social space (a). These correlations exhibit interesting dynamics: they are declining in
a, for any T, but the rate of decline cannot be ranked in T, given a; see Figure 3 for an
example with the same parametrization we used above for the policy weights in Figure
1.








































Figure 3.| Cross-sectional Auto-correlations.
In particular, given a T-period economy, consider the T-period rate of convergence of





We show analytically that ra;1 declines monotonically and becomes constant at the tail
in a.35 On the other hand, ra;T is typically non-monotonic in a, for longer horizons,
including for T = 1; see Figure 4. This is the case because each agent's policy function
results from the composition of two distinct eects, the cross-sectional interaction and
the dynamic eect of actions today in the future. The rst eect vanishes exponentially
34The rate is symmetrically dened with respect to agent 0, i.e., ra;T =
a 1;T
a;T , for any a  0.
35See the proof of Proposition 1 for the argument.
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with distance at equilibrium, while the rate at which the dynamic eect vanishes is
not constant. In fact, the sum of the two eects becomes hyperbolic in distance, i.e., it
decreases very sharply when you go beyond an agent's neighborhood and then stabilizes
with social distance. The non-monotonicity of the rate of convergence ra;T is the result
of the self-convolution of an hyperbolic sequence of policy coecients (see Equation
(4.4) and Figure 2), which enters in the computation of the covariance. In the case of
static economies (or equivalently, of economies in their last period), the dynamic eect
is not present, the sequence of policy coecients is therefore exponential (rather than
hyperbolic), and the rate of convergence ra;1 is monotonically decreasing.


































Figure 4.| Rate of Convergence of the Auto-correlations.








Similarly, let the same rate for the innite-horizon economy (T = 1) be represented by
r.
Proposition 1 (Tail Convergence Monotonicity) 36 The rate rT is monotone increas-
ing with respect to the length of the economy,
rT+1 > rT; for nite T  1:
36The proof is in Supplemental Appendix D.
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Moreover, the sequence of tail convergence rate for nite-horizon economies converges to
that of the innite-horizon economy as the horizon length gets larger and the limit rate
is strictly less than 1:
lim
T!1
rT = r < 1:
In other words, even though the autocorrelation functions might behave non-monotonically
for shorter social distances, they eventually converge (as social distance a ! 1) to an
exponential rate in the tail. Moreover, rates of tail convergence are higher the farther is
the nal period of the economy (as T ! 1). This is because rational agents choose to
correlate their actions more with their neighbors in early periods and progressively less
so as they approach the end of their social interactions. Finally, as the innite-horizon
limit is approached, the rate of tail convergence becomes stationary (as to be expected
since nite-horizon equilibria approximate the stationary innite-horizon equilibrium).
We use this intuition to the fullest extent when discussing identication in Section 6.
In an innite-horizon economy social interactions manifest themselves at the stationary
ergodic distribution by means of spatial autocorrelation of actions. Given x0 2 X, the
conditional covariance in period t of an innite-horizon economy, between two agents








. Let Cov (x0
1;xa
1) be
the a-step unconditional covariance at the ergodic stationary distribution. Since the
stationary MPE is ergodic, it is easy to see from Lemma 2 (i) and Theorem 4 that
as t gets arbitrarily large, the conditional t-period covariance between agents 0 and a

















   x0

Moreover, the limit unconditional correlation b between the actions of agents a and a+b
























Finally, because of the stationarity of the policy function in (4.2), the limit covariance
between two agents a agents away from each other can be written as









































and hence it has a simple recursive structure. In fact, since the sum of the station-
ary weights multiplying covariances on the right hand side are strictly less than one,
this system can be seen as a contraction operator. Hence, for each one-step conditional
autocorrelation sequence, there is a unique stationary unconditional autocorrelation se-
quence that we can compute using the above recursive system easily. We later exploit
this recursive structure further in Section 6.1 when we compare equilibrium stationary
distributions induced by myopic and rational agents.
In Figure 5, we report the correlation functions in both the mild and strong conformity
parameterizations as a function of social distance, b.37 Two eects are worth mentioning
here. Firstly, both correlation functions converge to zero as the distance between two
agents become arbitrarily large. Secondly, this convergence is much faster in the case of
mild interactions than in the case of strong interactions. For example, the correlation
between the equilibrium choices of agent a and agent a+3 (or a 3 due to symmetry) is
about 7% in the case of mild interactions whereas it is about 75% in the case of strong
interactions. The correlation between the equilibrium choices of agent a and agent a+6
are about 0% and 40% respectively. The strength of the desire to conform built in
individuals' preferences determine endogenously, at equilibrium, the size of the eective
neighborhood with which an individual interacts.
5. EQUILIBRIUM PROPERTIES AND COMPARATIVE DYNAMICS
In this section we rst study the welfare properties of equilibrium and then we use
the characterization of equilibria we obtained to produce several simulations illustrating
various comparative dynamics exercises of interest.
5.1. (In)eciency
Social interactions are modelled in this paper as a preference externality, that is,
by introducing a dependence of agent a's preferences on his/her peers' actions. Not
surprisingly, therefore, equilibria will not be ecient in general. In this section we also
37See Section 5.2 for the parameter values for the mild and strong interaction cases.
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Figure 5.| Correlation function at the ergodic distribution for Mild and Strong
Interactions.
characterize the form the ineciency takes when social interactions are modelled as
preferences for conformity.
A benevolent social planner, taking into account the preference externalities and at the
same time treating all agents symmetrically, would maximize the expected discounted
utility of a generic agent, say of agent a 2 A, by choosing a symmetric choice function h
in CB(X;X), the space of bounded, continuous, and X-valued measurable functions.











b I0 t); for t = 1;:::;T







































































38With the convention that hT (t 2)(Ra xt 2;Ra I0 t 1) = xa
0 when t = 1.
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where 0 is an absolutely continuous distribution on the initial choice proles with a
positive density. This problem can be written recursively. For any agent a 2 A, for all
t = 1;:::;T, and all (xT 1;T) 2 X  I(0), let the value of using the choice rule h in



















































which leads us to the following denition
Definition 2 (Recursive Planning Problem) Let a T-period linear economy with social
interactions and conformity preferences be given. Let 0 be an absolutely continuous
distribution on the initial choice proles with a positive density. A symmetric Markovian
choice function g : XI(0)f1;:::;Tg ! X is said to be ecient if it is a solution,

















































where t is the distribution on t-th period choice proles induced by 0 and the planner's
choice rule h.
As noted, preferences for conformity introduce an externality in each agent a 2 A's
decision problem, which depends directly on the actions of agents in neighbourhood N(a)
and, indirectly, on the actions of all agents in the economy. In equilibrium, agents do
not internalize the impact of their choices on other agents today and in the future. More
precisely,
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Theorem 5 (Ineciency of equilibrium) A symmetric MPE of a conformity economy
is inecient.
Furthermore, an ecient policy function will tend to weight less heavily the agent's
own-eect and more heavily other agents' eects, relative to the equilibrium policy. This
eect, hence the ineciency, are neatly exhibited by comparing the equations determin-
ing policy weights in the planner (E.3) and equilibrium (A.2) scenarios. The (absolute
value of the) weights the planner's equation associates on neighbors' choices is twice as






As a consequence, the relative weights that the planner assigns to neighbors' choices are
always higher than the ones that each agent uses in equilibrium.39










































Figure 6.| Ineciency of equilibrium.
A graphic representation of the ineciency is obtained in Figure 6, which presents the
coecient plot for the equilibrium policy of a one-period economy (equivalently the nal
period of any nite-horizon economy): ceqbm (blue dots), and for the planner's solution,





3 = 1, and  = :95).40
39Normalizing the relative coecients to form a probability measure (see the argument in the proof
of Lemma 2 (iv)), we have that the measure obtained from the planner's policy is a mean-preserving
spread of the measure obtained at equilibrium.
40We call this parametrization the mild-interaction case in Section 5.2.
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Figure 7.| Weights on past history in the stationary policy function.
5.2. Comparative Dynamics: Peer Eects
The strength of the agents' preferences for conformity depends on the size of the pref-
erence parameter 3 relatively to 1 and 2. A policy function is represented in Figure









20). On the x-axis, we plot agent a and his neighbors, while on the y-axis,
we plot the weights (cb)b2A that the symmetric policy function g associates with the last
period actions of agents (a + b)b2A. While each agent's interaction neighborhood is only
composed of two agents, in eect local interactions involve indirectly larger groups. How
large are the groups depends endogenously on the strength of the agents' preferences for
conformity. Notice e.g., that in Figure 7, local interactions involve eectively a group
of about ten neighbors when preferences for conformity are mild and involve a group
of about thirty neighbors when preferences for conformity are strong. Furthermore, for
the same cases of mild and strong conformity, we compare in Figure 8 the case in which
neighborhoods are overlapping, N(a) = fa   1;a + 1g, with the case of non-overlapping
one-sided neighborhoods, N(a) = fa + 1g.42 Two eects are present here. Firstly, as in
41The discount rate is xed at  = :95 in all the simulations unless mentioned otherwise.
42In this case, the policy function is
xa
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Figure 8.| One-sided vs. two-sided interactions.
Figure 7, an increase in the strength of the interaction parameter spreads the interaction
eects over a larger social geography. Secondly, this spread is observed most signicantly
in the case of non-overlapping neighborhoods due to the uni-directional nature of the
interactions.
At the ergodic stationary distribution, when the dependence of the agents' actions in
equilibrium are independent of the initial conguration of actions x0, such correlations
in endogenously formed groups is manifested in a phenomenon which we refer to as local
norms of behavior (see Figure 9).43 In Figure 9, we plot 100 neighboring agents on the
x-axis and their optimal choices drawn from the limit distribution at the same future
date, on the y-axis. In the top panel, clearly the optimal actions are more spread and
do not follow a signicant pattern. In the bottom panel though, the optimal choices are
more concentrated and follow a clear path. This is due to the fact that, in equilibrium
agents conform to the actions of neighboring agents, leading the way to the creation
of similar local behavior. In the bottom panel of Figure 9, we observe groups of agents
(e.g., in the neighborhood of agent 20) choosing relatively low actions, and other groups
43See Appendix G for details about how we simulate the ergodic stationary distribution of actions of
the economy.
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(e.g., in the neighborhood of agent 70) choosing instead high actions. Two interesting
aspects of this phenomenon are rstly that every individual uses the same symmetric
policy function to make his choices and all heterogeneity is captured by random types
and we still have high spatial correlation and high spatial variation. Secondly, the initial
conguration of actions is irrelevant since the limit distribution of individual actions in
this economy is ergodic.


















Figure 9.| Ergodic Limit of Mild (top) and Strong (bottom) Interactions for 100
neghboring agents.
5.3. Comparative Dynamics: Information
In Figure 10, we compare the case in which agents have complete information with the
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In particular, we record the eect of an expansion of the information set Ra I0 t (in-
dividuals whose types are observed by agent a) on best responses. We start with an
information structure in which each agent observes his own type only. We then increase
the number of types observed by each agent a (maintaining the symmetry of two-sided




H I H I




Figure 10.| Eect of Information on Interactions.
weights in the policy function of an of agent a as a response to the informational struc-
ture. The lower left vertex represents (H)istory, the total sum of weights assigned to last
period's choices. The lower right vertex represents (I)nformation, the sum of weights on
current types observed. Finally, the upper vertex represents average information, (M)ean
type,  . In part (a), we have mild preferences for conformity once again. The dots are
concentrated near the middle of the triangle (equal weights on history, information, and
mean type) and they do not move much as a response to changes in the amount of
current information. Part (d) is the counterpart with strong interactions. Hence the sig-
nicant change from almost no weight on current information to almost equal weights.
Individuals use the information in the best possible way by putting more weight on it
in their policy functions. This is due to the fact that forming expectations more pre-
cisely how the neighbors will behave becomes more important for each agent, due to






3 = 20) and part (b) is strong interactions and strong own-type eect






3 = 1). We do not see much change in (b), although most of the total weight
is put on information. This is mainly due to the fact that any agent a cares so much
about his current type that, he neglects the other eects. In (c), although the own-eect
is still strong, due to the strength of interactions, each agent uses the average information
to form the best expectations regarding the behavior of the other agents. As the amount
of information increases, each agent forms better expectations by transferring the policy
weight from average information to precise information on close neighbors.
6. IDENTIFICATION
We study here the identication of social interactions in the context of our linear
dynamic economy with conformity. Identication obtains when the restrictions imposed
on actions at equilibrium by preferences for conformity are distinct from those imposed
by other relevant structural models.44 Consider in particular an alternative structural
model characterized by (cross-sectionally) correlated preferences across agents. This spe-
cic alternative model is focal because correlated preferences could be generally due to
some sort of assortative matching or positive selection in social interaction, which in-
duces agents with correlated preferences to interact socially. Suppose an econometrician
observes panel data of individual actions over time displaying spatial correlation of indi-
vidual actions at each time. Such correlation can generally be due to social interactions,
as our analysis has shown. Such correlation could also ensue, however, from the spatial
correlation of preference types, which we have excluded by assumption in our analysis
to this point. But is there any structure in the spatial correlation which is implied by
preference for conformity and not by correlated preferences? An armative answer to
this question implies that the social interaction model is identied with respect to the
correlated preferences model.
The structural analysis of identication in linear economies with social interactions
starts with Manski (1993).45 Manski restricts his analysis to static linear models, or, more
specically, linear economies in which the social interactions operate through the mean
44The question of identication in economics has been clearly dened by Koopmans (1949) and Koop-
mans and Reiersl (1950). The issue of identication goes back to Pigou (1910), Schultz (1938), Frisch
(1934, 1938), Marschak (1942), Wald (1950), Hurwicz (1950). By identication we mean identication
in population (Sometimes identication in population is called identiability; see e.g., Chiappori and
Ekeland (2009). More recent surveys on the topic exist of course; see Rothenberg (1971), Hausman and
Taylor (1983), Hsiao (1983), Matzkin (2007), and Dufour and Hsiao (2008).
45Blume et al. (2011), Blume and Durlauf (2005), Brock and Durlauf (2007), Graham (2011), and
Manski (1993, 2000, 2007) survey the main questions pertaining to identication in this social context.
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action in a pre-specied group, (linear in means models). In this context, identication is
problematic due to the colinearity problem introduced by the mean action, the so-called
reection problem, and due to the possible correlation of unobservables. In the context of
linear in means models, a recent literature has studied identication under the condition
that the population of agents could be partitioned into a sequence of nitely-populated
non-overlapping groups; see e.g., Graham and Hahn (2005).46
The economies we study in this paper are related to those studied by Manski (1993)
and others in that we maintain linearity, an assumption which renders identication
harder (see Blume et al. (2011)). On the other hand, we introduce several fundamental
distinguishing features: In particular, we allow for more general forms of social interac-
tions across agents and for dynamic economies. More precisely, in the class of economies





















By studying populations composed of an innite number of overlapping neighborhoods
our analysis sheds some light on the nature of identication results which exploit an
innite number of non-overlapping groups, as in Graham and Hahn (2005) and in the
literature discussed in footnote 46. The overlapping structure of our neighborhoods, in
fact, breaks the independence which is required when non-overlapping groups are consid-
ered.48 Furthermore, by studying dynamic models we are able to exploit the theoretical
implications deriving from the optimality of the dynamic choices of agents on time series
autocorrelations of actions, over and above the implications regarding the cross-sectional
46Also: Davezies et al. (2009) extends these results exploiting variation over the size of the popula-
tions; Graham (2008) uses excess variance across groups; Bramoull e et al. (2009) uses reference group
heterogeneity for identication. Other recent contributions include Glaeser and Scheinkman (2001), De
Paula (2009), Evans et al. (1992), Ioannides and Zabel (2008), and Zanella (2007).
47Note that, to ease the comparison we adopt here the best-reply representation of equilibrium actions;
see equation (3.2).
48We maintain however the assumption of symmetric neighborhoods, an assumption which, as is
the case for linearity, renders identication harder: See Bramoull e et al. (2009) for a study of the
identication power of observable asymmetric neighborhoods.
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(spatial) correlations. In a related context, De Paula (2009) and Brock and Durlauf (2010)
also exploit the properties of dynamic equilibrium, the discontinuity in adoption curves
in their continuous time model, to identify social interactions. Finally, Patacchini, Rain-
one, and Zenou (2011) exploits the intertemporal variation in individual choices relative
to individual and peers' characteristics to identify social interactions in education from
contextual and correlated eects. 49
We turn to our main identication results. The rst series of results regards the identi-
cation of the dynamic structure|that is, distinguishing the properties of dynamic social
interaction economies from those of myopic (hence static) economies. The second series
of results regards instead the identication of social interactions, that is, distinguishing
preference for conformity from correlated preferences.
6.1. Dynamic Rationality vs. Myopia
In this section we compare equilibrium congurations of dynamic economies with
rational agents with those of economies with myopic agents. When agents are myopic,
even economies with a dynamic structure, e.g., when agents' actions at time t depend
on their previous actions, are eectively static. These economies have been extensively
studied in the theoretical and empirical literature on social interactions, following the
mathematical physics literature in statistical mechanics on interacting particle systems.
Suppose that myopic agents, when called to make a choice, act as if they expect never to
be called to act again.50 Given initial history xt 1 and realization t, each myopic agent
a 2 A chooses xa
















































49See also Cabral (1990) for an early discussion of these issues and Young (2009); see Blume et al.
(2011) for an up to date survey.
50See e.g., Blume and Durlauf (2001), Brock and Durlauf (2001b) and Glaeser and Scheinkman (2003)
for a comprehensive survey. Liggett (1985) is the standard reference for the mathematical literature.
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where we make explicit the dependence of the policy function on the preference param-
eters  = (1;2;3).51 The coecients of the policy function ga;m are equal to the ones
of the unique MPE policy function of a one-period (T = 1) social interactions economy:
cb;m = cb
1, db;m = db
1, for b 2 A. In this sense, myopic models are nested within the class
of dynamic models we study.
In the following we ask whether the spatial correlations generated by the long-run
stationary distribution of an innite-horizon model can be distinguished from those ob-
tained as the limit distribution of a myopic model. Let ga(xt 1; a
t;) denote agent a's
policy function from the dynamic social interaction model, where we make once again
explicit the dependence of the policy function on . We say that (xa
t)a2A
t1 is a stochastic






t;); for any a 2 A and any t  1
We instead say that (xa
t)a2A
t1 is a stochastic process induced by the myopic economy with




a;m(xt 1;t;); for any a 2 A and any t  1
We are now ready to introduce our denition of identication of social interactions.
Definition 3 Let (xa
t)a2A
t1 denote a stochastic process induced by the dynamic economy
with parameters . We say that the dynamic economy with parameters  is identied with
respect to myopic economies if there does not exist an ^ , such that the process (xa
t)a2A
t1 is
also induced by a myopic economy with parameter ^ .
51In some of the literature, myopic agents are modelled not only as assuming that all agents in the
economy only interact once, but also that their neighbors are not changing their previous period actions.























It can be shown, see Glaeser and Scheinkman (2003), that the ergodic stationary distribution of actions
in this economy coincides with that of myopic agents as dened in the text. As a consequence, our
identication results extend to this economy as well.
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The characterization of the spatial correlation of actions at equilibrium for dierent
time-horizons T, which we provided in Section 4.2, gives us a straightforward answer to
the identication question. Recall in fact that the coecients of the policy function ga;m
are equal to the ones of the unique MPE policy function of a one-period (T = 1) social
interactions economy. Recall also that the covariances between agents's choices obtained
from data generated by a typical model of innite-horizon stationary social interactions
are fundamentally dierent from those generated by a myopic model. In particular, we




is non-monotonic in a, for longer horizon economies; and so is ra, the ratio of the limit
economy with T = 1); while ra;1 declines monotonically in a, for any ; see Figure 4.
Moreover, the limit unconditional covariances inherit the (non)-monotonicity features
of their one-step conditional counterparts. Finally, by continuity, the non-monotonicity
property necessarily holds for an open set of the parameter space, and is hence robust.
Summarizing, then, we have the following.52
Proposition 2 (Rationality vs. Myopia) A dynamic economy with parameter  is
identied with respect to myopic economies, for a robust subset .
Finally, consider an econometrician tting a static (myopic) model through data gen-
erated by the dynamic equilibrium of an economy with parameter . From Proposi-
tion 1, r1() < r() for any possible . As a consequence, the parameter ^  estimated
by the econometrician imposing the static (myopic) structure on the data, will satisfy






As a consequence, 
^ 3





1 + 2 + 23

;
and the econometrician overestimates the social interaction eects.
52We present in Appendix F.1 the results of a simulation where we report ra as a function of a, at






53Remember that 1 := 1 + 2 + 23.
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6.2. Social Interactions vs. Selection
In our dynamic economies, spatial correlation of individual actions at each time is
induced by social interactions and preference for conformity. But spatial correlation of
actions could be induced in principle also by spatial correlation of preference types, with
no social interaction. Take two agents, e.g., agent a and agent b. A positive correlation
between xa
t and xb
t could be due to a positive correlation between a
t and b
t. In this
last case, preferences for conformity and social interactions would play no role in the
correlation of actions at equilibrium. Rather, such correlation would be due to the fact
that agents have correlated preferences. As we already noted, correlated preferences
could be generally due to some sort of assortative matching or positive selection in social
interaction, which induces agents with correlated preferences to interact socially.
In our economy, at a symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium, each agent a 2 A acts
according to the policy function ga
T (t 1)(xt 1; a
t;), where we make once again explicit
the dependence of the policy function on the preference parameters  = (1;2;3). If
T = 1, the policy function is stationary ga(xt 1; a
t;). Recall that the parameter 3
represents the weight of conformity in each agent's preferences. It follows that 3 = 0
corresponds to an economy with no social interactions. We say that (xa
t)a2A
t1 is a stochastic
process induced by  and (a
t)a2A







t;); for any a 2 A and any t = 1;:::;T
We are now ready to construct our denition of identication of social interactions.
Definition 4 Let (xa
t)a2A










t+1) = 0 for any a 6= b 2 A and any t  1. We say that  is identied if there
does not exist an ^ , with ^ 3 = 0, such that the process (xa
t)a2A
t1 is also induced by ^  and
some stochastic process f^ a
tga2A
t1 . We say that social interactions are identied if some
, with 3 > 0, is identied.
The conditions for identication of social interactions can be weakened by restricting
the stochastic process f^ a
tga2A
t1 . We say that  is (resp. social interactions are) identied
relative to a set of preference shocks if f^ a
tga2A
t1 in Denition 4 is required to belong to a
set of preference shocks which satises some specic restriction.
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Finally, the conditions for idencation of social interactions can be strengthened by
limiting the observable properties of the process (xa
t)a2A
t1 .
We rst consider the case of an innite horizon economy: policy functions are sta-
tionary and an ergodic distribution exists. In this context, we study rst the possibility
of obtaining identication by observing the properties of the stationary distribution of
actions rather than the whole panel (xa
t)a2A
t1 . We then pass on to identication tout court,
that is exploiting the whole dynamic restrictions imposed by the model on (xa
t)a2A
t1 , not
just the restrictions on the stationary distribution. We shall see that results are negative
in both cases, that is, identication is not obtained in general. Secondarily, we study
identication relative to a series of relevant restrictions on the stochastic process for
preference shocks f^ a
tga2A
t1 . These restrictions are meant to capture natural properties of
the selection mechanism which induces agents to display spatially correlated preferences.
6.2.1. Innite horizon (stationary) economies
Consider rst the stationary distribution of actions as identied by its implied spatial
correlation function b.
Proposition 3 Social interactions are not identied by the properties of the spa-
tial correlation function b of the stationary distribution of actions in innite horizon
economies.
The proof is simple and instructive hence is given below.
Proof: We have shown in Section 3.3 that the stationary distribution of our dynamic
economy with social interactions, that is, 3 > 0, and i.i.d. preference shock process
fa
tga2A























Consider now an alternative specication of our economy with no interactions between
agents (^ 3 = 0) and no habits (^ 1 = 0) but simply a preference shock process f^ a
tga2A
t1
and own type eects with ^ 2 > 0. For this economy, equilibrium choice of agent a at
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time t is given by xa
t = ^ a
t. As long as the process f^ a
tga2A























the probability distributions that the two specications (with and without interactions))
generate on the observables of interest, fxa
tga2A
t1 , are identical. Hence, one cannot identify
from the stationary distribution of choices which specication generates the data. Q.E.D.
More generally, we investigate if the dynamic equilibrium restrictions of our model are
sucient to identify social interactions.
Proposition 4 Social interactions are not identied in innite horizon economies.54
An intuition about this result can be obtained by loosely reducing the identication
of social interactions in innite horizon economies to the well known problem of distin-
guishing a VAR from an MA(1) process. Stacking in a vector xt (resp. t) the actions
xa
t over the index a 2 A (resp. the preference shocks a
t), policy functions can be loosely
written as a VAR:
xt = xt 1 + t; with t =  t + e
where E (tt ) = 0 for all  > 0: Under standard stationarity assumptions, the VAR
has an MA(1) representation
xt = (IA   L)
 1t = t + 	1t 1 + 	2t 2 + :::
for a sequence 	1;	2 ::: such that (IA   L)(IA + 	1L + 	2L2 + :::) = IA: The argu-
ment in the proof of Proposition 4 therefore amounts to picking
xt = ^ t = t + 	1t 1 + 	2t 2 + ::::
54The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 3 with the extra requirement that observational-
equivalence should also hold for processes with an initial condition and for their intertemporal transi-
tions. We put the proof in the Supplemental Appendix F.2 for interested readers.
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6.2.2. Finite-horizon (non-stationary) economies
Consider now the case of a nite horizon economy. In this case the unique policy func-
tion and the distribution of actions are non-stationary, as we have shown, and hence
identication might obtain in those environments where correlated eects satisfy a weak
stationary law through time. Consider then a restriction to the class of admissible pref-
erence shock processes f^ a
tga2A
t1 which satisfy the following conditional covariance sta-
tionarity restriction:
Definition 5 (Conditional Covariance Stationarity) A process f^ a
tga2A
t1 is said to be





   ^ t 1; ; ^ 1

= Z(a;b; ^ t 1;:::; ^ t n) 2
R, for a;b 2 A, t = n + 1;:::;T.55
This condition denes a large class of stochastic processes for which the covariance
between the preference shocks of any two agents a and b, depends on at most a nite
memory (represented by n) of past realizations of the process, and possibly the relative
positions of agents a and b in the social group. It is a relatively weak and natural condition
in that it allows for the tailoring of the intertemporal dependence of agents' types to
their relative positions in the network; what it excludes is events in the distant past from
having a signicant eect on the joint determination of agents' types today.56 Conditional
covariance stationarity of preference shocks is in fact sucient for identication of social
interactions.
Proposition 5 Social interactions are identied relative to processes satisfying the
conditional covariance stationarity restriction with n  T   2.
While the spatial autocorrelations between agents' choices have limited memory across
55The original denition is due to Mandelbrot (1967) who provides the conditional spectral analysis
of sporadically varying random functions in the mathematical theory of information transmission with
noise. In his environment, he requires E
h
^ t ^ t+n

 1  t < t + n  T
i
to be independent of t. Ours is
a slightly weaker condition since it uses xed nite memory. For more recent usage of conditional
covariance restrictions see the Times Series literature studying persistence of conditional variances,
especially Bollerslev and Engle (1993), Bollerslev et al. (1994), and Engle and Bollerslev (1986).
56All existing social interaction models we can think of have stochastic structures that are special
cases of this class. More specically, they typically assume either time-independent or nite memory
Markov structures to model exogenous eects; see e.g., Brock and Durlauf (2001b), Conley and Topa
(2003), De Paula (2009), Glaeser and Scheinkman (2001), Nakajima (2007), Topa (2001), and Young
(2009).
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periods in the absence of interaction eects, they vary in presence of social interactions.57
The condition n  T   2 guarantees that the economy lasts longer than the memory
of the spatial auto-correlation process, so that the non-stationarity of the equilibrium
process can manifest itself in the dynamics of spatial auto-correlations. This is at the
heart of the proof, whose details follow.
Proof: Consider a nite-horizon, T-period economy with T  2 and n  T   2. In
the absence of interactions (^ 3 = 0), agent a's nal period optimal choice is58
x
a
T = c1 (^ )x
a
T 1 + d1 (^ ) ^ 
a
T (6.1)
Thanks to the linearity of the policy functions across periods with ^ 3 = 0, any path of
shock realizations (^ 1;:::; ^ T 1), given x0, generates a path of congurations (x0;x1;:::;xT 1).
Thus, conditioning on all imaginable choice paths spans all imaginable preference shock
paths, given that the observables are generated by the above-mentioned policy functions.
The a-step covariance between equilibrium choices of agent 0 and a in case of interactions













































thus the covariance term is independent of the conditioned upon path. So, in order
the specication with no interactions to be observationally indistinguishable from the
interactions case, the a-step conditional covariances, computed using (6.1) should satisfy,















T ; ^ 
a
T j ^ T 1;:::; ^ 1;x0

= d1(^ )
2 Z(0;a; ^ T 1;:::; ^ T n)
= d1(^ )
2  Z(0;a) (6.3)
57More specically, they can be ordered with respect to their spatial rate of tail convergence; see
Proposition 1.
58In the absence of interactions, agents solve (dynamic) individual maximization problems. Elemen-
tary dynamic programming techniques, as in Stokey and Lucas (1989), yield the policy functions we use
here.
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The function  Z is implicitly dened to capture the fact that to match the covariance term
in (6.2), the covariance in (6.3) can depend only on the relative positions of agents and
on nothing else. This is not an assumption but an observational-equivalence restriction.
The same observational-equivalence idea should hold for all a 2 A, in period T   1.



















2 Z(0;a; ^ T 2;:::; ^ T 1 n); 8(^ T 2;:::; ^ T 1 n)
= d2(^ )
2  Z(0;a) (6.4)
where the rst equality is as in (6.2); second is the restriction imposed by observable
indistinguishability combined with conditional covariance stationarity; nally third is by
conditional covariance stationarity across periods using (6.3). Putting the equilibrium


































Since the choice of a is arbitrary, we can look at the same expression as a becomes






































which is a contradiction to Proposition 1. Therefore, there does not exist a conditional
covariance stationary preference shock process f^ a
tga2A
t1 that generates an equilibrium
choice process fxa
tga2A
t1 under the no interactions specication (^ 3 = 0) that is observa-
tionally equivalent to the process generated by the local interactions (3 6= 0) process.
This concludes the proof. Q.E.D.
7. EXTENSIONS
The class of social interaction economies we studied in this paper has been restricted
along several dimensions to better provide a stark theoretical analysis. Some of these
restrictions, however, turn out to be important in applications and empirical work. In
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this section, therefore, we illustrate how our analysis can be extended to study more
general neighborhood network structures for social interactions, more general stochastic
processes for preference shocks, the addition of global interactions, that is, interactions
at the population level, and the eects of stock variables which carry habit eects.
7.1. General Neighborhood Network Structures
Throughout the paper, we studied symmetric neighborhood structures. This is gen-
eralized easily. Consider an arbitrary neighborhood network structure (not necessarily
translation invariant), N : A ! 2A. Suppose also that a generic agent a's preferences are

































Notice that we allow for the preferences of any two agents a and b to be arbitrarily
dierent in their parametrization, provided either a;1 > 0 or a;2 > 0 and
P
b2N(a) a;b <
1 so that peer eects are bounded. Under this specication, best-responses are well
dened, interior, and well-behaved. An MPE exists and the policy function of an arbitrary































t = 1. For
uniqueness of equilibrium, it is sucient that the relative composition of the peer eects
within the determinants of individual choice be uniformly bounded, i.e., that there exists
a positive constant K such that for each individual a 2 A
P
b2N(a) a;b




Under this condition,59 best responses induce a contraction operator and we obtain a
59A related condition is referred to, in the literature, as the Moderate Social Inuence condition; see
e.g. Glaeser and Scheinkman (2003), Horst and Scheinkman (2006), and Ballester, Calv o-Armengol, and
Zenou (2006) for restrictions in a similar spirit.
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unique equilibrium for any nite-horizon economy.
Ergodicity (relative to a given MPE) and welfare results extend straightforwardly,
as do identication results. Notably, our positive identication result for non-stationary
economies, Proposition 5, also extends: since preference parameters of any agent a are
stationary, in a nite-horizon economy, correlations of equilibrium actions between agents
vary only due to interactions for preference processes that satisfy a Conditional Covari-
ance Stationarity restriction.
7.2. General Stochastic Processes for Preference Shocks
The agents in our model make their decisions based on past behavior and current
shocks. Our analysis however extends straightforwardly to economies where shocks are
persistent across time as long as the economy is one of complete information.60 We give
here, as an illustration, an example of Markov dependence, where at any given period
the probability of next period shocks depends on current realizations.
Consider any T-period economy with T  1. Recall from Section 2 that preference
shocks t := (a
t)a2A are dened on the canonical probability space (;F;P), where
 := f(a)a2A : a 2 g. Let Q :   F ! R+ be a transition function such that
(i) for any period t and any  2 , Q(;A) = Prft+1 2 Ajt = g, for all A 2 F.
(ii) for each A 2 F, Q(;A) is F-measurable.
Any agent a 2 A solves the problem in (2.1) with persistent shocks where the expectation
operator acts on the distribution induced by Q and other agents' strategies. We can write
the problem recursively. The policy function of an arbitrary agent a 2 A at equilibrium,

















t + eT (t 1) (t;a)
for some positive coecients (cb
T (t 1))b2A, (db
T (t 1))b2A, and some constant eT (t 1) (t;a)
that depends only on the current type prole and on the agent's name, a.
Once again, existence, ergodicity (relative to a given MPE), and welfare results extend
straightforwardly, as well as our identication results.
60The mathematical issues arising in dynamic models with incomplete information are both well-
known and outside the scope of the present paper. See Mailath and Samuelson (2006) for an extensive
survey.
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7.3. Global Interactions
Introducing global determinants of individual behavior into our framework is also
relatively straightforward.61 In particular, consider an economy in which the preferences
of each agent a 2 A depend also on the average action of the agents in the economy. Let






















The preferences of the agent a 2 A in period t are described by the instantaneous utility




































Given x 2 Xe, the initial conguration of actions, a symmetric stationary MPE of a
dynamic economy with local and global interactions is a map g : X    X ! X and
a map F : X ! X such that, for each a 2 A:
g (R
a xt 1;R














































pt+1 = F (pt); p1 = p(x) and pt = p(xt) almost surely.62
61With respect to the analysis of MPE with local and global interactions in nite economies (as e.g.,
in Blume and Durlauf (2001) and in Glaeser and Scheinkman (2003)), a few technical subtleties arise in
our economy due to the innite number of agents. The techniques we use are extensions of the ones we
used in a previous paper, Bisin, Horst, and  Ozg ur (2006). We refer the reader to this paper for details.
Some of the needed mathematical analysis is developed in F ollmer and Horst (2001) and Horst and
Scheinkman (2006).
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At a symmetric MPE, any agent rationally anticipates that all others play according to
the policy function g and also anticipates the sequence of average actions fp(xt)gt2N to
be determined recursively via the map F.
For this economy, we can show that the endogenous sequence of average actions
fp(xt)gt2N exists almost surely if the initial conguration x belongs to Xe, and that
it follows a deterministic recursive relation.63 As a consequence, our main results extend












t + e   + B
(p(x))
for some positive coecients (cb)b2A, (db)b2A, e, and some constant B(p(x)) that depends
only on the initial average action, p(x).
7.4. Social Accumulation of Habits
In this section, we generalize the class of the economies we have studied to encompass
a richer structure of dynamic dependence of agents' actions at equilibrium. Consider an

































t represents an accumulated stock variable,
S
a






t captures what the addiction literature calls a \reinforcement eect"





















Note that in equilibrium each agent's choice depends on the stock of his neighbors'
actions, that is, on their long-term behavioral patterns rather than just their previous
63Linearity is crucial for these results. Only in this case, in fact, can the dynamics of average actions
fp(xt)gt2N be described recursively. In models with more general local interactions, the average action
typically is not a sucient statistic for the aggregate behavior of the conguration x; hence a recursive
relation typically fails to hold. In such more general cases, the analysis must be pursued in terms of
empirical elds. Interested reader should consult F ollmer and Horst (2001).
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period actions. Also, as the nal period approaches, agent a assigns uniformly higher
weights to his own stock.
8. CONCLUSION
Social interactions provide a rationale for several important phenomena at the inter-
section of economics and sociology. The theoretical and empirical study of economies
with social interactions, however, has been hindered by several obstacles. Theoretically,
the analysis of equilibria in these economies induces generally intractable mathematical
problems: equilibria are represented formally by a xed point in conguration of actions,
typically an innite dimensional object; and embedding equilibria in a full dynamic econ-
omy adds a second innite dimensional element to the analysis. Computationally, these
economies are also generally plagued by a curse of dimensionality associated to their large
state space. Finally, in applications and empirical work, social interactions are typically
identied, even with population data, only under heroic assumptions.
In this paper we have attempted to show how some of these obstacles to the study
of economies with social interactions can be overcome. Admittedly, we have restricted
our analysis to linear economies, but in this context we have been able i) to obtain sev-
eral desirable theoretical properties, like existence, uniqueness, ergodicity; ii) to develop
simple recursive methods to rapidly compute equilibria; and iii) to characterize several
general properties of dynamic equilibria. Furthermore, while linearity in principle renders
the identication problem in static economies with social interaction almost insurmount-
able, we have been able to exploit the properties of dynamic equilibria in non-stationary
economies to produce a positive identication result.
In conclusion, we believe that the class of dynamic linear economies with social inter-
actions we have studied in this paper can be fruitfully and easily employed in applied
and empirical work.
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APPENDIX A: THE EXISTENCE PROOF
We prove here Theorem 1. The proof is constructive and works in three steps, by induc-
tion on the length of the economy.1
Step 1: Existence, uniqueness and the Markov property for T = 1. In this
symmetric environment, it is enough to analyze the optimization problem of a single
agent, say of agent 0 2 A. We will allow for arbitrary initial histories so that one can
interpret the current step either as a one-period economy or the last period of a nite-
horizon economy. We will show that, agents will use only the information contained in
the previous period choices x0 and current type realizations 1. Let any t-length history
(xt 1;t) = (x (t 1); (t 2);:::;x 1;0;x0;1) of previous choices and preference shock
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1We laid out the problem in its recursive form for clarity in Section 2. Our method of proof attacks
the sequence problem directly.
1
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where 1 := 1 + 2 + 23 > 0. This choice is feasible (in X) since it is a convex
combination of elements of X, a convex set by assumption. The objective function
(A.1) is strictly concave in x0
1, thus x0
1 in (A.2) is the unique optimizer. The form in
(A.2) suggests that showing the existence of a symmetric equilibrium in the contin-
uation given history (xt 1;t) is equivalent to nding the xed point of an operator
L1 : B ((X  )t;X) ! B ((X  )t;X) that acts on the class of bounded measurable
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Clearly, L1 is a self-map. We show next that it is a contraction. Endow B ((X  )t;X)
with the sup norm which makes (B ((X  )t;X);jj  jj1) a Banach space. Pick x1; ^ x1 2
















  1 x
0
0 + 2 
0














0   2 
0




















































































kx1   ^ x1k1
The coecient 23 
 1
1 < 1 since i > 0, for i = 1;2;3. Hence L1 is a contraction on
B ((X  )t;X). Thus, by Banach Fixed Point Theorem (see e.g., Aliprantis and Border
(2006), p.95) L1 has a unique xed point x
1 in B ((X  )t;X). Next, we argue that
this equilibrium strategy must be Markovian and should take the convex combination
form as in the statement of Theorem 1.
Lemma 1 (Markov Property and the Convex Combination Form) Unique symmet-
ric equilibrium strategy x
1 is Markovian: For any t-length history (xt 1;t), it depends
ectaart.cls ver. 2006/04/11 file: OB_Supplement.tex date: April 5, 20113
solely on last period equilibrium choices and current preference shock realizations, i.e.
x
1(xt 1;t) = g1(x0;1), for some g1 : X   ! X. Moreover, the Markovian policy





> > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > :
g : X   ! X s.t. g(x; ) =
P
a2A ca xa +
P
a2A da a + e
with
(i) ca;da;e  0 and e +
P
a2A(ca + da) = 1
(ii) (1
2)ca+1 + (1
2)ca 1  ca;8a 6= 0
(iii) cb  ca;8a;b 2 A with jbj > jaj:
(iv) ca = c a; 8a 2 A
and properties (ii), (iii), and (iv) also holding for the d = (da)a2A sequence.
9
> > > > > > > > > > > =
> > > > > > > > > > > ;
be the class of functions that are convex combinations (i) of one-period before history,
current types and average type, having the (ii) `convexity', (iii) `monotonicity', and (iv)
`symmetry' properties. Property (ii) states that the rate of `spatial' (cross-sectional)
convergence of the policy weights is non-increasing in both directions, relative to the
origin. Monotonicity property, (iii), has a very natural interpretation: agent b's eect on
agent 0's marginal utility is smaller than agent a's eect on it, if a is closer to 0 than b
is. Finally, (iv) says that the policy weights are symmetric around 0. Let g 2 G be such




and let (c;d;e) be the coecient sequence associated with g. Applying L1 to x1 (hence
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The function after the last equality sign is linear in x0;1 and  . So, L1x1 preserves the
same linear form. By denition of the new coecient sequence (^ c; ^ d; ^ e) in (A.5), each
element of the sequence is nonnegative since each element of the original one was so.
New coecients sum up to 1 since convex combination form of g makes the sum of the
coecients inside the two parentheses on the right hand side of (A.4) equal to 1. Thus,
the total sum of coecients on the right hand side of (A.4) is 
 1
1 (1 + 2 + 23) = 1,
which proves property (i). The nal form in (A.5) is just a regrouping of elements in
(A.4). Let (^ ca)a2A be the new coecient sequence associated with L1xT as dened in
equation (A.5). Pick a 6= 0 in A,
^ c





































By denition of ^ c in (A.5), rst inequality is strict if jaj = 1, is an equality otherwise;
second inequality is by property (ii) on c; last equality is once again by denition of ^ c
in (A.5). Therefore, for any a 6= 0 in A, ^ ca+1 + ^ ca 1  2^ ca, which is property (ii). Pick






















































First equality is from (A.5); second by property (iv) of G in (A.3); the inequality is
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property (iii) of G in (A.3); next equality is due to property (iv) of G again; and nally
the last equality is by (A.5). Hence, property (iii) in (A.3) holds for the new sequence.






























where rst equality is by (A.5); the second is due to (iv) of G in (A.3); nally the last
is again by (A.5).
Thus, the restriction of L1 to the subspace (call it BG) of bounded measurable func-
tions that agree with an element of G after any history, maps elements of BG into itself.
Moreover, endowed with the sup norm, BG is a closed subset of B ((X  )t;X) since
it is dened by equality and inequality constraints, hence a complete metric space in its
own right. Since L1 is a contraction on this latter as we just showed, it is so on BG too
and the unique xed point x
1 in B ((X  )t;X) must lie in BG. Since the choice of t
was arbitrary, the unique symmetric equilibrium in a one-period (continuation) economy,
after any length history must be Markovian and should assume the convex combination
form stated in the theorem. This concludes the proof of Lemma 1. Q.E.D.
This proves Step 1, namely that the statement of the Theorem is true for 1-period
economies. Next, we prove that this result generalizes to any nite-horizon economy.
Step 2: Induction, T-1 implies T. Let T  2. Assume that the statement of Theorem
1 is true up to T  1-period. The T-period economy can be separated into a rst period
and a T 1-period continuation economy. By hypothesis, there exists a unique symmetric
MPE, g : X    f1; ;T   1g 7! X, for the T   1-period continuation economy.
Agent 0 believes that all other agents, including his own reincarnations, will use that










b I0 t); for all t = 2;:::;T
Given any t-length history (xt 1;t), the current strategies of all other agents (xb
1)b6=0,
and the fact that (xb
t)b2A
t2 are induced by g, agent 0 solves













































































The form of the optimal choices on the equilibrium path can be characterized as in the
following Lemma.
Lemma 2 (Convexity and Monotonicity) Given a T-period economy, equilibrium choices
satisfy the following properties:
(i) For any period t  2, xa




































t (s 1) + eT (t s) 
!
(ii) For any a;b 2 A, any t  2,
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2 by (A.3) (iii). Suppose the claim is true for
t  k and let t = k + 1. Assume w.l.o.g that a < b. Let s := maxfs 2 A : s  a+b
2 g
and  s : min = fs 2 A : s  a+b






k  0 ( 0) for s  s

































































































































































The term in the brackets is nonnegative by hypothesis. Since a < b, s  0 which implies
that c
s
T k  c s




T k for any s  0 which means that
the argument in the parenthesis is nonnegative too. So, the claim is true. The analysis
for the case a > b is a straightforward modication of the same argument.
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t 1  0 (A.7)
The weights in the last parenthesis are negative by property (ii) in (A.3). By iteratively
applying the policy functions from period t backwards, at each iteration the weights on
one-period before choices would all be positive and one preserves the convex combination
form. This process ends after t 1 iteration, the end result being a convex combination
of (xb
1)b2A, t and  . Thus, the weight on xa
1 is positive, which makes the last term in the
last line positive. Therefore the claim is true.









































First and second equalities and the rst inequality are by the denition of the policy
mapping and (i) of Lemma 2; CT (t 1) is the sum of coecients on the past history


















But T (t 1) = 1 + 2 +
P
b6=0 b





































which concludes the proof of Lemma 2. Q.E.D.
Thanks to the linearity of the optimal future choices as shown in Lemma 2, agent 0's
problem (A.6) is dierentiable with respect to x0
1 and the unconstrained (x0
















































































































Agent 0's problem (A.6) is strictly concave in his choice x0
1 since the second partial of
the objective function with respect to x0
1,  T by denition, is negative, or





















































Consequently, the FOC characterizes the unique maximizer of the unconstrained prob-
lem (x0
1 2 R). The following Lemma shows that equation (A.9) has a much simpler
representation.
Lemma 3 (Interiority) Equation (A.9) can be written alternatively as
0 =  x
0
1 T + 1 x
0









1 + T   (A.11)
where T := 1 + 2 +
P
a6=0 a
T + T and the coecients 1, 2, (a
T)a6=0, and T are
non-negative.
Proof: The coecient of xa
1 in (A.11), a
T, is the total eect of a change in xa
1 (a 6= 0)
on the expected discounted marginal utility of agent 0 (the right hand side of (A.9)),




















































































For any   2, the last two term in the summand for each period in equation (A.12)
































































The equality is due to the symmetry of the policy function across agents; Lemma 2
(ii) and (iii) imply that the terms in the parentheses are non-positive and the terms in
the brackets are non-negative, respectively. Similarly, the rst terms in the summand in




































































































due to Lemma 2 (iv). Thus, we established the non-positiveness of each term of the
summand for any period   2 in (A.12). Since, the latter is basically a nite weighted
some of such terms with a negative sign in front, for any a 2 A, a
T  0. Finally we
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Expectation washes out all individual a
's and we have only   apart from (xa
1)a2A in
each period's expression in (A.14). By symmetry of the form in Lemma (2) (i) across
agents, the weight on   in x0
t, is equal to the weight on   in x1














] = 0. This makes the second line of (A.14) equal
to zero. By Lemma (2)-(i), the weight on   in E[x0
t], 1   t
s=2CT (t 1) (residual of
the sum of the eects of fxb
1g) is bigger than that in E[x0










]  0. By Lemma (2)-(i), @
@  E[x0









 0. All these together imply that the expression in (A.14) is non-
negative. Each E[xb




with the help of Lemma 2-(i). Since at each iteration, convex combination structure is
preserved, it is so at the end too. Then, the sum of coecients in each of the dierences
involving those variables in the parentheses is zero. This in turn implies that the total
sum of coecients in (A.9) is zero. Thus, the alternative formulation in (A.11) is true.
This concludes the proof of Lemma 3. Q.E.D.
By isolating the choice x0
1 on the left hand side, we can write the maximizer of the
unconstrained problem as a convex combination of x0
0; 0
1; (xa


















1 + T  
!
(A.15)
Each of these are elements of X, a convex set. Thus, the optimal choice of the uncon-
strained problem is in the feasible set of the constrained problem, hence it is its unique
maximizer. The form in (A.15) implies that showing the existence of a symmetric equi-
librium policy for the rst period of a T-period economy is equivalent to nding the
xed point of an operator LT : B ((X  )t;X) ! B ((X  )t;X) that acts on the
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+ T  
!
Clearly LT is a self-map. Using straightforward modications of the arguments in the





























< 1 since i > 0, i = 1;2;3. Thus, LT is a contraction
on the Banach space of bounded measurable functions (B((X  )t;X);jj  jj1), hence
has a unique xed point x
1. Once again, by the same token as in Lemma 1, perfect
equilibria are necessarily Markovian thus we can focus attention on Markovian strategies.
As in the proof of Lemma 1, it suces to show that LT(BG)  BG. To that eect, let
x1 2 BG be such that there exists a g 2 G for which after any history (xt 1;t), one
has x1(xt 1;t) = g(x0;1); let (c;d;e) be the coecient sequence associated with g.








































































The expression above is linear in x0;1 and  . So, LT x1 is linear. By denition of the
new coecient sequence (^ c; ^ d; ^ e), each element of the new sequence is nonnegative since
each element of the original one was so and the new elements are positive weighted sums






T +T) = 1 since (A.16) (which is equivalent to (A.17)) is a convex
combination of elements and of functions that are convex combinations of elements of
the convex set X. This proves property (i). The proof of the properties (ii), (iii), and
(iv) follows identical arguments as in Lemma 1. Thus, the unique xed point x
1 should
lie in the set BG with an associated equilibrium Markovian policy function g
T .
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Therefore, when the symmetric continuation equilibrium policies are Markovian, i.e.,
g : X    f1; ;T   1g 7! X, after any history (xt 1;t), the unique symmetric
equilibrium policy in the rst period, g
T is Markovian too. Since the choice of t was ar-
bitrary, this must be true for any length history. Now, construct the policy function g as
g
T(x0;1) = g
T (x0;1) for any initial (x0;1); and g
T (t 1)(xt 1;t) = gT (t 1)(xt 1;t),
for all t 2 f2; ;Tg and all (xt 1;t). But then, the function g is by construction the
unique MPE of the T-period economy. This completes the induction step for any given
T  2. Therefore, the claim in Theorem 1 is true for any nite horizon economy.
Step 3: Convergence and stationarity. This step proves that the sequence of nite
horizon symmetric Markovian equilibria tends to a stationary symmetric Markov Perfect
equilibrium. To do that, we treat nite-horizon economies as nite truncations of the
innite-horizon economy. Let G1 :=
Q1
t=1 G be the innite-horizon Markovian strategy
set. For a xed discount factor  2 (0;1), let L := fT 2 [0;1]1 j T;t = t 1; for 1 
t  T;and T;t = 0; for t > T; where T 2 f1;2;:::g [ f1gg be the space of exponen-
tially declining sequences (at the rate ) that are equal to zero after the T-th element.
Endow L with the sup norm.
Lemma 4 (Compactness) L and G endowed with the supnorm are compact metric
spaces.
Proof: Let (Tn)n be a sequence lying in L that converges to x = (xt) 2 [0;1]1.
This implies that Tn;t ! xt, for all t  1, which in turn means that xt 2 f0;tg by
the construction of L. Moreover, if xt = 0 for some t, xt+ = 0 for all   1 since the
terms Tn are geometric (nite or innite) sequences. There are two possibilities: either
x = (1;;:::;T;0;0;:::) or x = t for all t  1. Both lie in L which means that the
limit of any convergent sequence in L lies in L. This establishes that L is closed.
Given any  > 0, choose N  1, a natural number, s.t. N < . It is easy to see that
any element in L lies in the -neighborhood (with respect to the sup metric) of one of
the elements in the nite set f1;2;:::;Ng  L. This establishes that L is totally









; for all a 2 A
	
. Dened by inequality constraints,
this set is closed under the sup norm. We will show that it is also totally bounded. For
ectaart.cls ver. 2006/04/11 file: OB_Supplement.tex date: April 5, 201114
a given  > 0, one can nd an N  1 s.t. 1
2N < . Pick a sequence  x 2 H. For any a 2 A
s.t. jaj  N, [0;(2N) 1]  B1(xa;), the -ball around xa with respect to the sup norm.
For jaj  N, let Y (a) := f0;;2;:::;ka;(2a) 1g, where ka is the greatest integer s.t.




x 2 H j x
a =  x










is a nite set of elements of H. Moreover, it is dense in H by construction. This establishes
that H is totally bounded. Thus, H is compact under the sup norm.
Each g 2 G is associated with coecients ((ca;da)a;e). Clearly, for any sequence of
policies in G, gn ! g in sup norm if and only if the associated coecients ((ca
n;da
n)a;en) !
((ca;da)a;e) in sup norm. We know from (A.3) that c satises properties (i);(ii) and
(iii). Thus, for any a 2 A, c0 > c1 > ::: > cjaj, ca = c a and
P
jbjjaj cb < 1. Combining
all these, we have 2jajca <
P
jbjjaj cb < 1 which in turn implies that ca < 1
2jaj, for
all a 2 A. Same bounds hold for the d sequence. But then, the space of associated
coecient sequences, call it LG, can be seen as a closed subset of H, a compact metric.
Consequently, LG is compact, thus sequentially compact. Pick a sequence (gn) 2 G and
let (cn;dn;en) be the associated coecient sequence lying in LG. Since LG is sequentially
compact, there exists a subsequence (cmn;dmn;emn) ! (c;d;e) 2 LG. The latter, being




a daa + e . Thus, the respective policy subsequence gmn ! g 2 G. This establishes
that G is sequentially compact hence compact. This concludes the proof of Lemma 4.
Q.E.D.
Given g 2 G1, let xa(g) be agent a's strategy induced by g, i.e., xa(g)(xt 1;t) =
gt(Ra xt 1;Ra t), for all a 2 A and all (xt 1;t). Dene the objective function U for
agent 0 in the class of truncated economies as U : G1  L  G1 as
U(g

















   (x0;1)
#
where u represents the conformity preferences and N(0) = f 1;1g as in Assumption 1.
Let the feasibility correspondence   : LG1 ! G1 be dened for T < 1 as  (T;g) =
fg0 2 G1 j g0
t(x;) =  ; 8t > T; 8(x;) 2 Xg, and for T = 1 as  (1;g) = G1. It
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is easy to see, thanks to the monotonicity of   in T (through T) and the compactness
of G that   is a compact-valued and continuous correspondence. Moreover, as the next
Lemma shows, the parameterized objective function U is continuous in g0, the choice
variable.
Lemma 5 (Continuity) For any given (T;g) 2 L G1, U(; T;g) is continuous on
 (T;g) with respect to the product topology.
Proof: Since G endowed with the sup norm is a compact metric space due to Lemma
4, the metric d(g;g0) :=
P1
t=1 2 tjjgt   g0
tjj1 induces the product topology on G1 (see
e.g., Aliprantis and Border (2006, p. 90)), where jj  jj1 is the supnorm as before. Let
(T;g) 2 L  G1 and  > 0 be given. Set 0 := (
1 
1 T+1). The period utility u is
uniformly continuous since X is compact. Thus, one can choose a 0 > 0 such that for
any t, jx0
t   y0
























  < 
0:
Set  = 2 T0. Pick g0;g00 2  (T;g) such that d(g0;g00) < . This implies that for all
t  T, jjg0
t  g00
t jj1 < 2T = 0 hence jx0
t(g0) x0
t(g00)j < . Uniform continuity of u then
implies that the period utility levels are uniformly bounded above by 0 for all periods
t  T. The claim therefore follows from
jU(g
0 ; T;g)   U(g






For every T-period symmetric Markovian equilibrium policy sequence gT, dene
gT 2 G1 as





T (t 1)(x;); if t  T
 ; if t > T
G1 endowed with the product topology is compact since each G endowed with the
supnorm is compact from Lemma 4. Since product topology is metrizable, say with
metric d,3 (G1;d) is a compact metric space hence the sequence (gT)T has a convergent
3See Footnote 4 for an example of metrization of product topology.
ectaart.cls ver. 2006/04/11 file: OB_Supplement.tex date: April 5, 201116
subsequence (gTn)Tnin G1 that converges say to g 2 G1. Let M : L  G1 ! G1
be the correspondence of maximizers of U given the value of the parameters. Also, let
E : L ! G1 be the symmetric equilibrium correspondence for the sequence of nite































































































Tn) for all Tn. Since U is continuous in the choice dimension due
to Lemma 5 and that the feasibility correspondence   is continuous, by the Maximum
Theorem (see Berge (1963), p. 115), the correspondence of maximizers, M, is upper
hemi-continuous. This implies that if (Tn;g
Tn) ! (1;g), then g 2 M(1;g) hence
g is a symmetric MPE of the innite-horizon economy. This implies immediately that
the equilibrium correspondence E is upper hemi-continuous too.
Uniqueness of nite-horizon symmetric MPEs imply that E is single-valued hence
continuous for T < 1. Dene F(T) := E(T), for T < 1 and let F(1) = g.
This way, F is continuous on the space L, which is compact under the supnorm by
Lemma 4. Consequently, F is uniformly continuous. This means, for a given  > 0, we
can pick  > 0 small enough so that jjT   T0jj1 <  implies d(F(T);F(T0)) < 
2.
We know from the previous approximation that for T ! 1 there is a subsequence
gTn ! g. Since (T)T is convergent, it is Cauchy. So, choose T() large enough such
that 8T;T 0  T(), jjT  T0jj <  and 8Tn  T(), jjgTn  gjj1 < 
2. Pick, then, any
element Tn of the subsequence and any other element, T 0 such that Tn;T 0  T(). We
have



















The rst inequality is the triangle inequality; the second is due to the uniform continuity
of F and the third is by the fact that gTn ! g uniformly. This proves that the whole
sequence gT ! g uniformly. The implication of this latter is that, as the nite-horizon
economies approach the innite-horizon economy, every two consecutive period, we make
choices approximately with respect to the same MPE policy, hence g is stationary. This
concludes Step 3 which in turn establishes the proof of the statement of Theorem 1.

APPENDIX B: PROOF OF THE RECURSIVE COMPUTATION THEOREM
Here we prove Theorem 3. Consider a nite-horizon T-period economy with conformity
preferences (i > 0, i = 1;2;3) and complete information. For part (i), we simply assume
that T = 1 and show that one can t an exponentially declining sequence into equation
A.2. Since that equation has a unique solution as argued in the existence proof, that
solution must have exponentially declining coecients. Matching the coecients of the


















Dividing both sides by da















































r1 + 1 = 0






  4 > 0 since 1 = 1 + 2 + 23 > 23 (remember that
i > 0 for i = 1;2;3). The equation has two positive roots, one bigger and one smaller
than 1. The bigger root cannot work since it is explosive as jaj ! 1. We pick the smaller
root










  1 < 1





spanning the interval (0;1) for dierent values of the former























The rst equality is due to the exponentiality of the sequence; the third uses the same
argument as in (A.8) with 1 = 0, for the coecient sequence (da
1)a2A. Solving for d0
1
























; for a 2 A
The argument for the sequence (ca









. This proves part (i) of the theorem.
For part (ii), observe that the parameters of the maps Ls, namely s;(a
s);s are





=1 as dened in (A.10),
(A.12), and (A.14), simply because these are \forward-looking" expressions. We saw
in the induction step (Step 2) of the existence proof that Ls dened in this fashion
becomes a contraction and has a unique xed point, which is the coecient sequence of
the rst-period policy of an s-period continuation. This establishes part (ii).
For part (iii), observe that each g 2 G is associated with coecients ((ca;da)a;e).
Clearly, for any sequence of policies in G, gn ! g in sup norm if and only if the associated
coecients ((ca
n;da
n)a;en) ! ((ca;da)a;e) in sup norm. In Step 3 of the existence proof,
we establish the convergence of the nite-horizon equilibrium policies to the stationary
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innite-horizon MPE policy as the horizon expands. But this implies that the associated
unique coecient sequence also should converge, then, to the coecient sequence of the
innite-horizon stationary MPE policy. This establishes part (iii) of Theorem 3. 
APPENDIX C: PROOF OF ERGODICITY






a2A is i.i.d. with
respect to a and t according to . Let  be the initial measure on the conguration space























Given that (xt 2 X)1
t=0 is an equilibrium process generated by the stationary MPE g









































































a2A is i.i.d., xa
0 and
xa
1 are distributed identically when the initial measure is . Since the choice of a was
arbitrary,  is a stationary distribution of the Markov process (xt)
1
t=0. Moreover, from































































Thus, independent of the initial conditions, xa





































The rst term of the previous expression Ct ! 0 since C < 1 due to i > 0, for
all i. The rst term in the parentheses in the summand is a convex combination of
uniformly bounded terms. Hence, the rst part of the above expression goes to 0 as
t ! 1. Moreover, since the equilibrium is symmetric, the convergence is uniform across
agents: xt ! x = (xa) uniformly. Since the exogenous shock process is i.i.d, the law for
















which is the `t-translated-into-the-past' version of the former. Thus, for any given initial
value x0, and a path (:::; 1;0), the pointwise limit of xa























t=0 P() and  := (:::; 1;0;). Pick any f 2 C(X;R), the set of
bounded, continuous, and measurable, real-valued functions from X into R. Let 0 be
an arbitrary initial distribution for x0. We have









































































The rst equality is from (C.2); the second is due to Lebesgue Dominated Conver-
gence theorem (see e.g. Aliprantis and Border (2006), p. 415); third is due to the





fd, meaning that the sequence of equilibrium distributions t gen-
erated by the exogenous law P and the stationary MPE policy g converges weakly to the
invariant distribution . The choice of 0 was arbitrary. Hence, for any initial distribu-
tion, the induced equilibrium process converges weakly to the same invariant distribution
. Therefore,  is the unique invariant distribution of the equilibrium process. Here is
why: Suppose that ^  is another invariant distribution. This implies that the induced
process starting with 0 = ^  should satisfy t = ^ , for all t = 1;2;:::. From the above
convergence argument t !  weakly. Hence ^  = .
Finally, to show ergodicity, pick an f 2 B(X;R), the set of bounded, measurable,
real-valued functions from X into R. The process starting with  is stationary, hence
t =  for all t = 0;1;:::. Since the process xt is stationary, so is the process (f (xt)).
We can then use Birkho's Ergodic Theorem (see e.g. Aliprantis and Border (2006), p.










almost surely. Since the choice of f was arbitrary, the last expression holds for all f 2
B(X;R). Thus the equilibrium process (xt 2 X)1
t=0 starting from initial distribution 
is ergodic. This concludes the proof of Theorem 4. 
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APPENDIX D: TAIL CONVERGENCE MONOTONICITY
We prove here Proposition 1. The proof is by induction on T. For T = 1, we know from
Theorem 3 (i) that the policy coecient sequence (da
1)a2A is exponentially declining on
both sides of the origin, at the rate r1. From the form of the policy function in Theorem
























































































































































The rst equality is a partitioning, the second a simple change of variable, and the third
is due to the symmetry and the exponentiality of the da
1 sequence. Substituting the nal

























which implies that the rate of decay of the covariances is greater than r1, for any a  0.
Since the second term on the right hand side of (D.2) decays at the rate r1, this implies















decreases monotonically, and being non-negative, it converges. Actually it converges to
zero. Here is why: Since the ratio is less than 1, suppose that it converges to k 2 (0;1).
This means from (D.2) that the limit rate of decay of the covariances is r1 + k, greater
than the rate for the term in the numerator in (D.3). Thus, the ratio in (D.3) should
converge to zero at the limit, a contradiction to k 2 (0;1). So, the limit of (D.3) is zero,
























 = r1 (D.4)












clines exponentially on both tails at the same rate r1 and the statement is true for
T = 1.
Now assume that the statement in Proposition 1 is true for economies up to T   1
period. We will show that it should also hold for T-period economies. We will base the
main induction arguments on the following Lemma.





b2A in Lemma 3 and the equilibrium coecient sequence
(cT;dT) for the rst-period policy of a T-period economy have the following properties:







































= rT > rT 1:








where u represents the conformity
preferences in Assumption 1. Let u0(t) := @
@x0
1u(t). From equation (A.12), a
T can be




















































We will present the argument for the second term inside the summand and the method










































































































































Hence at the tail, the second term of the sum inside the brackets of D.5 decays at the
rate rT 1. The same one-step transition argument applies to each terms of the sum,
in equation (D.5). Moreover, since (D.5) is a discounted sum, the entire expression is
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inheriting the rate of tail convergence of the continuation economy, as is argued in the
Lemma. The method of proof for a  0 is identical thanks to the symmetry of the
environment.
For the second part of Lemma 6, let D(rT 1) be the space of sequences that satises
the properties in (A.3) and that converges at the tail at a rate rT  rT 1. This is a
closed subset of the space of sequences that satisfy only the properties in (A.3), hence
a complete metric space itself. Consequently, the unique coecient sequence dT that is
the xed point of the map in (A.15) should lie in D(rT 1). Let D0(rT 1)  D(rT 1) be
the space of sequences in D(rT 1) whose convergence at the tail is strictly greater than
rT 1. We will show below that the map in (A:15) maps elements of D(rT 1) into the set
D0(rT 1), which will imply that the unique solution of the map (A:15) converges at a
rate rT > rT 1 at the tail.





































































































The second equality is a partioning of the sum taking agent a as the `middle'; the rst
sum after the third equality is a simple shift and change of the dummy variable b; the
rst term after the rst equality sign is by multiplying and dividing each term in the
summand by b
T; nally the last term after the fourth equality sign is by multiplying and
dividing each term in the summand by d
2a b
T . Since all elements involved are non-zero,
the algebraic manipulation above is feasible. We can add to and substract from equation
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The analogous expression for ^ d2a
T is given, after a similar partitioning with agent a as
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converge. This is because
as a gets arbitrarily large, the numerator converges at the rate rT 1 rT and the denom-
inator at a rate greater than equal to r2
T. Since both ratios are strictly less than one,
one of the following two possibilities must hold: either (i) they converge to a positive
constant less than one (the case where rT = rT 1) or (ii) they converge to zero (the case
where rT > rT 1). The rst case is not possible. Suppose it is. Then, rT = rT 1. This





















a contradiction. Therefore the second case (ii) must be true. The argument for a  0
is symmetric. This means that any sequence dT 2 D(rT 1) is mapped to a sequence
^ dT 2 D0(rT 1), meaning that it converges at the rate rT > rT 1 at the tail. So our claim
in the beginning is true and the unique sequence dT that satises properties in (A.3)
and the equation (A.15) converges at the tail at a rate rT > rT 1. This concludes the
proof of Lemma 6. Q.E.D.
For the rest of the proof of Proposition 1, assume that the statement in Proposition
1 is true for economies up to T   1 period. We will show that it should also hold for
T-period economies. Consider rst the covariance between agents 0 and 2a + 1, with



































































































where the algebraic manipulation is the same as in the proof of Lemma 6. The analogous

















































We know from Lemma 6 that as a ! 1, the ratio (d
a+1
T =da
T) ! rT > rT 1. This implies,


























































  rT > rT 1
and straightforward modications of the argument used in the proof of Lemma 6 im-





























































 = rT > rT 1
thus the statement of Proposition 1 is true for any nite T-period economy. Clearly,
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rT  1 for any T  1 since the non-negative d sequences sum up to less than 1. Hence,
what we have is a monotone increasing sequence bounded from above by 1. Hence, the
limit r1 = limT!1 rT exists and is less than or equal to 1. Moreover, we know from
Theorem 3 that the sequence of nite-horizon MPE coecients converges to that of the
innite-horizon MPE coecient sequence d, thus r1 is the tail convergence rate of the
innite-horizon MPE coecient sequence d. Therefore r1 < 1 since otherwise that would
contradict the summability of the sequence d. This establishes the proof of Proposition
1. 
APPENDIX E: PROOF OF INEFFICIENCY
We give here the proof of Theorem 5 for economies with complete information. The
extension of the line of proof to the incomplete information economies is straightforward.
Finite-Horizon: Take any nite horizon economy (T < 1). We will use continuity
arguments so endow the underlying space X   with the product topology. Product
topology is metrizable, say by metric d4. In the nal period of this nite horizon economy,
with absolutely continuous distribution T 1 on the space of choice proles xT 1
5 with
a positive density, the planner maximizes ex-ante (before the realization of T) the
expected utility of a given agent, say of agent 0 2 A, by choosing a symmetric policy
function h 2 CB(X;X), the space of bounded, continuous, and X-valued measurable
functions. 6
The space X   is compact with respect to the product topology since X and 
are compact. Since the utility function is continuous and strictly concave in all argu-
ments, the maximizer exists and it is unique. The necessary condition for optimality is
summarized in the following lemma.




2 a (jxa   x0
aj + ja   0
aj)
Since X =  = [x;  x] is a compact interval, this is a well-dened metric that metrizes the product
topology on X  . See also Aliprantis and Border (2006), p. 90.
5Starting with an initial 0 which is absolutely continuous, the MPE policy function and the ab-
solutely continuous preference shocks induce a sequence (t) of absolutely continuous distributions on
t-period equilibrium choice proles.
6Since the planner's choice rule is symmetric, the choice of agent 0 rather than another agent is
inconsequential.
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 1 T)   h(xT 1;T)

+ 3 (h(RxT 1;RT)   h(xT 1;T))






Proof: The proof uses an extension of the usual calculus of variation techniques to our
symmetric strategic environment. We prove it for the class of bounded, continuous, and
measurable, real-valued functions on X  . Then, we use the restriction of the result
to a subset of it, the space of bounded, continuous, and measurable, X-valued functions.
Suppose that the function h provides the maximum for the planner's problem. For any
other admissible function h0, dene k = h0   h. Consider now the expected utility from















where a is an arbitrary real number and u represents the conformity preferences in
Assumption 1.. Since h maximizes the planner's problem, the function J must assume
its maximum at a = 0. Leibnitz's rule for dierentiation under an integral along with




u2 k + u3 k  R
 1 + u4 k  R

dPdT 1
where ui is the partial derivative of u with respect to the i-th argument. For J to assume








































P(dT)T 1 (dxT 1) = 0
for any arbitrary admissible deviation k. Suppose that the statement of the lemma is
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0;h( x;  );h(R
 1  x;R





1;h(R  x;R  );h( x;  );h(R
2  x;R









 2  );h( x;  );  
 1
(E.1)
Assume w.l.o.g. that the above expression takes a positive value (the proof for the
case with a negative value is identical). Since the utility function, its partials, and the
deviation functions are all continuous with respect to the product topology, and that
the measures  and P have positive densities, there exists a (  P)-positive measure
neigborhood A  X around ( x;  ) such that the above expression stays positive for
all (xT 1;T) 2 A.7 Assume that a1 = ( x;  ), a2 = (R  x;R  ), and a3 = (R 1  x;R 1  )
are distinct points. Otherwise, since the underlying space X is a real interval and the
maps R and R 1 are right and left shift maps, one can always pick a point in A that
has that property.
Now choose  > 0 small enough so that the -balls B (a1), B (a2), and B (a3) are
disjoint. R and R 1 being both continuous are homeomorphisms. So, one can nd  >
1 > 0 and  > 2 > 0 such that R(B1 (a1))  B (a2) and R 1 (B2 (a1))  B (a3).
Let  = minf1;2g and A1 := B (a1). We next dene a particular deviation k. Let the
function k be dened as




 [   d((x;);a1)]; if (x;) 2 A1
0; otherwise.
where  > 0 is a scalable constant. This is possible because A1, R(A1) and R 1(A1)
are disjoint sets. Constructed this way, k is a bounded, continuous, and measurable
function8. Substitute k into equation (E.1). By construction, the only set on which k
is positive is the set A1 which is itself a subset of A, the set of elements of X   for
which the expression (E.1) is positive. Hence, evaluated with the constructed deviation
function k, J0(0) > 0, a contradiction to the fact that the policy function h was optimal.
7Endowed with the product topology, the space X   is metrizable by the metric d. See footnote
4. Product topology and the associated metric allows us to choose positive measure proper subsets of
X for choices of near-by agents and the whole sets X and  for far-away agents, staying at the same
time in the close vicinity of the point ( x;  ).
8We endow the range space, the real line, with the Borel -eld hence any continuous function into
the real line is automatically measurable.
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Therefore the statement of the lemma must be true. This concludes the proof. Q.E.D.
This implies that










 1 T) + 23 h(RxT 1;RT)

As in the proof of existence, the operator induced by (E.3) is a contraction on the
Banach space of bounded, continuous, measurable functions with the supnorm, whose








































































By matching coecients, we get for all a 2 A
c
a
























































  1 with P = 1 + 2 + 43: (E.5)
We next compare the equilibrium policy sequence in Theorem 3 with the planner's



















which implies that rP > r1 since rP is decreasing in P by (E.5). Thus, the planner's
optimal policy coecient sequence converges to zero slower than the equilibrium policy
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coecient sequence. Moreover, the equilibrium policy cannot satisfy the FOC of the
planner's problem. Therefore, the equilibrium is inecient for nite-horizon economies.
Innite-Horizon: The argument here is very similar to the one in the nite horizon













T + e  
We argue that this solution cannot satisfy the planner's problem's optimality condition.








Let V h be the continuation value of using the function h in the future, dened recursively
as
V













h (H (xT 1;T);T+1) P(dT+1) (E.7)
where u is as in Assumption 1. Since the policy h 2 G is linear and the utility function is
continuously dierentiable and strictly concave with respect to all arguments, elementary
dynamic programming techniques (see e.g. Stokey and Lucas (1989)) guarantee that the
value function V h exists, it is bounded, continuous, strictly concave and continuously
dierentiable. Denote by V h
a the partial derivative of V h with respect to agent a's initial
choice. Given an initial absolutely continuous distribution T 1 on the space of previous
period's choice proles with positive density, the planner maximizes agent 0's expected




















Once again, the solution exists and it is unique thanks to the compactness (with respect
to the product topology) of the underlying space X   and the continuity and strict
concavity of the utility and value functions. A straightforward modication of the rst
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For the equilibrium policy to be ecient, it needs to satisfy both FOCs for any (xT 1;T) 2
X  . For the quadratic specication, this entails




































































P(dT+1) = 0 (E.8)
The next lemma says that there exists a positive measure subset of the underlying space
on which the expression in (E.8) is non-zero.
Lemma 8 Let

^ x; ^ 

2 X be the point where ^ xa =  x and ^ a =  x, for all a 2 A9. The
expression in (E.8) is negative on a positive measure subset E  X  , that includes 
^ x; ^ 

.
9Recall from Assumption 1 that  x is the upper boundary of the feasible action and type sets X and
.
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where xt is written as, using iterations of the policy function g and Lemma 2 (i) with




































^ x; ^ 

, xa
T =  x for all a 2 A. So, the rst part after the equality sign in
(E.10) is the same for all agents. Since the preference shocks are i.i.d., the second part
will be the same for all agents in expectations, which eliminates the terms in the second
line after the equality sign in (E.9). Thanks to Lemma 2 (i), @
@xa
T x0
t > 0 for any a 2 A,
and for all t = T + 1;:::;T + N. But then, the second term in (E.9) after the rst
bracket is negative in expectations. This is because using (E.10) E[x0
t j (xT;T+1)] =
Ct T  x + (1   Ct T)   >  , where C =
P
a ca. The rst term after the bracket sign too









j (xT;T+1)] = C
t T  x + (1   C
t T)     C
t 1 T  x   (1   C
t 1 T)  
= C
t 1 T (1   C)
      x

< 0
































which shows that the summand in (E.9) is negative in expectations in every period. In
turn, the whole sum, then, until the last line of (E.9), is negative in expectations for
any arbitrary N. The choice of a was arbitrary and that V h
a is continuous on X  
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for any a 2 A. The latter is compact with respect to the product topology. Hence, V h
a
is bounded. So, one can choose an N large enough to make the N+1 V h
a (xt+N;t+N+1)
term arbitrarily small. This implies that the whole expression in (E.9) is negative, which
in turn means that V h
a

^ x; ^ 

< 0 for any a 2 A.
At the point

^ x; ^ 

, the rst line of (E.8) is zero and the second line is negative, as
we just showed, which makes the whole expression in (E.8) negative. Since the rst line
in (E.8) is continuous and so are Va for any a 2 A, the whole expression in (E.8) is
continuous. Hence, as in the proof of Lemma 7, there exists a (  P)-positive measure
neigborhood E  X around ( x;  ) such that the above expression stays negative for
all (xT 1;T) 2 E. This concludes the proof. Q.E.D.
The statement of Lemma 8 leads to a contradiction since it means that the planner's
optimal rule and the equilibrium policy function g does not agree on E. Therefore, g is
inecient. This concludes the proof. 
APPENDIX F: IDENTIFICATION
F.1. Rationality vs. Myopia
We prove here Proposition 2. We showed in the proof of Proposition 1 (Tail Con-






decreasing in a for any underlying preference parameter vector , converging eventually,
at the tail, to the rate r1 given in Theorem 3 (i). Moreover, as we showed in Section 4.2,
the cross-sectional covariances at the stationary distribution can be written recursively





























Since the c1 and d1 sequences are exponential at the rate r1 from Theorem 3 (i), by
straightforward modications of the arguments in the rst part of the proof of Propo-






monotonically as a gets large.
However, the above ratio for the stationary policy function is non-monotonic for a set
of parameter values. See the table below where we plot the above ratio for any parameter
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r1 ::: r5 ::: r9 ::: r1
.4757 ::: .3543 ::: .3571 ::: .3680






a for the chosen parameter vector  . Moreover, the map in (3.2) that generates the
policy weights as xed points is continuous in the parameters (1;2;3) of the utility
function. Thus, there is an open-neighborhood around   such that for each element ^ 
of that neighborhood, the same non-monotonicity property obtains. This concludes the
proof. 
We conjecture that this non-monotonicity property should hold for the entire admissi-






as a function of a (x-axis), at the stationary distribution, for dierent levels of strength





.10 Clearly, for a large set of parameters, non-
monotonicity obtains at the stationary distribution. The limit auto-correlation function
for the myopic model, on the contrary, inherits the behavior of its one-step transition
counterpart: it converges at a monotonically decreasing rate.
F.2. Lack of Identication in Innite Horizon Economies
















t + e  










2 f0:1;0:2;0:75;0:9g and  = :95. Note that the results
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respectively for the Top-Left, Top-Right, Bottom-Left, and Bottom-Right panels.































t (s 1) + e() 
!
Consider now the alternative specication with no interactions between agents (^ 3 = 0)
and no habits (^ 1 = 0), a preference shock process f^ a
tga2A
t1 and own type eects with
^ 2 > 0. For this economy, equilibrium choice of agent a at time t is given by
x
a
t = ^ 
a
t
Dening the new preference shock process f^ a
tga2A
t1 as
11In Lemma 2, the iteration stops once it reaches period 1. But, since a stationary MPE exists by
Theorem 1, we iterate here once more on the form in Lemma 2 using the stationary policy function and
write equilibrium choices as a function of the initial conditions x0.





























t (s 1) + e() 

would imply that for an arbitrary initial distribution 0 for x0, the joint probability
distributions that the two specications (with and without interactions)) generate on
the process fxa
tga2A
t1 , are identical. Moreover, if one allows for innite histories, one can

























and obtain observational equivalence once again. Hence, we conclude that identication
is not possible. This concludes the proof. 
APPENDIX G: DETAILS ABOUT THE SIMULATIONS
We build an articial economy that consists of a large number of agents ( jAj =
1300;2500, and 5000, depending on the treatment) distributed on the one-dimensional
integer lattice. At both ends \buer" agents that act randomly are added to smooth
boundary eects. Depending on the treatment, we start the economy with the following
initial conguration of choices: (i) the highest action for all agents; (ii) the lowest action
for all agents, (iii) the action equal to the mean shock for all agents.
The core engine behind the simulations is a Matlab code, g.m, which computes the
equilibrium policy weights recursively as outlined in Section 3.2 of the paper. The code
is posted on  Ozg ur's webpage, http://www.sceco.umontreal.ca/onurozgur/, at the Uni-
versit e de Montr eal; the code contains also detailed explanations. The correlation com-
putations use another code, cor.m, also available on  Ozg ur's webpage.
Both codes use as input parameters values of the preference parameters i, i = 1;2;3,
the discount factor , the horizon for the economy T, the number of agents jAj, and the
longest distance between agents for which the equilibrium correlation is computed M.




a=1 from the interval [ D;D] according to the uniform distribution
(this is for simplicity since all results in the paper are distribution-free).
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